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THEORIES OF WATER POLLUTION LITIGATIONt
PETER N. DAVIs*
The common law has traditionally provided the rules that govern
relationships among landowners in their use of watercourses. These
rules are embodied in the eastern United States in the doctrine of
riparian rights, which addresses itself both to water quantity, and
to water quality. Persons complaining of pollution of waters abut-
ting their lands have, in addition to redress by complaint to the
state pollution control agency, redress by lawsuit against the al-
leged polluter. This common law supplements the body of statu-
tory law regulating the waters of the state for the benefit of the
people.
I. PRIVATE NUISANCE V. RIPARIAN RIGHTs
The American common law concerning pollution of watercourses
is by no means clear or unconfused. The cases constitute a morass
of conflicting doctrines, and represent efforts to deal with indi-
vidual situations rather than to provide clarity in defining legal
rights. This article will attempt to shed light on the scope of the
confusion and will suggest a way of approaching the problem of
water pollution.
Water pollution cases contain a fundamental source of confu-
sion: which legal theory is to be followed-natural flow, reasonable
use or private nuisance? Unfortunately, American decisions do not
distinguish clearly among these disparate concepts. As a result, the
cases frequently bear no relationship to each other in doctrine or
in result.
t This article originated during a cooperative project between the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and the Water Resources Center of the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, and is part of an extensive report prepared by the
interdisciplinary Wisconsin River Water Quality Management Project. The
project investigated hydrologic, economic, and institutional problems, and
suggested several proposals for more efficient systems to control and im-
prove the quality of the Wisconsin River. Research funds for this article
were provided, through the Water Resources Center, by the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior, Project No. OWRR C-1228, under authority of the
Water Resources Act of 1964, Title II, as amended by P.L. 89-414. Heiner
Giese contributed substantial research assistance to this article. Work
done by two attorneys in the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Harold H.
Ellis and J. Peter DeBraal, has been drawn upon and is credited where
referred to.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.A.
1959, Haverford; LL.B., 1963, University of Wisconsin. Member, U.S. Su-
preme Court, Wisconsin, District of Columbia, and U.S. Patent Office Bars.
Formerly, General Attorney, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic
Research Service, Natural Resources Economics Division.
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A. Definitions of Riparian Rights and Nuisance
The question basic to water pollution litigation is whether a
landowner has a right to discharge wastes into a stream, and, it is,
perhaps, the most confusing question of all, because the cases dis-
cuss two basic concepts, riparian rights and nuisance, without
clearly delineating which controls the decision or without even
recognizing that the two are distinct doctrines. The confusion is
illustrated by cases which state that violation of riparian rights
constitutes a nuisance,' and those which state that a nuisance con-
dition constitutes a violation of riparian rights.2 While a particu-
lar pollution situation may constitute both a violation of ripar-
ian rights and a nuisance, the equivalence does not exist in every
situation. For courts to equate the two can only muddy the legal
analysis required for arriving at future decisions.
1. RIPARIAN RIGHTS
The riparian rights doctrine has been accepted in 31 eastern states
as the prevailing rule controlling rights to use water in water-
courses.3 It was first clearly formulated in 1827 in the landmark
case, Tyler v. Wilkinson.4 Each proprietor of land abutting on a
watercourse has a co-equal right to use water in that watercourse.
However, the statement of that correlative right has always con-
talned two inconsistent concepts: under the natural flow concept,
each riparian proprietor is entitled to have the water in the water-
course come down to him unchanged in quantity or quality; but,
following the reasonable use doctrine, each riparian proprietor has
a co-equal right to make reasonable uses of that water even if some
alteration in quantity, quality, or flow pattern occurs. The inter-
pretation of riparianism followed in each state is determined by
which of these two concepts is emphasized by its courts. Most
states have adopted the "reasonable use" concept of riparian rights.
While some early stream diversion and obstruction cases in Wis-
1. Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co. v. Turner, 145 Ala. 639, 649-50,
39 So. 603, 605 (1905); Peterson v. City of Santa Rosa, 119 Ca]. 387, 392,
51 P. 557, 559 (1897); City of Kewanee v. Otley, 204 Ill. 402, 409, 68 N.E. 388,
390-91 (1903); Neubauer v. Overlea Realty Co., 142 Md. 87, 98, 120 A. 69, 73
(1923); Southland Co. v. Aaron, 221 Miss. 59, 72-73, 72 So. 2d 161, 165-66
(1954); Holsman v. Boiling Spring Bleaching Co., 14 N.J. Eq. 335, 342-43
(Ch. 1862); City of Mansfield v. Balliett, 65 Ohio St. 451, 466-67, 63
N.E. 86, 90-91 (1902).
2. Platt Bros. & Co. v. Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531, 547, 45 A. 154, 161
(1900); Barton v. Union Cattle Co., 28 Neb. 350, 356-57, 44 N.W. 454, 455-56
(1899); Trevett v. Prison Ass'n, 98 Va. 332, 336-37, 36 S.E. 373, 374 (1900).
3. In the western states the rule of prior appropriation is followed.
Because it is so different in concept from riparianism, the rules concerning
water pollution are also different. This article will not discuss those
western rules.
4. 24 F. Cas. 472 (No. 14,312) (C.C.D.R.I. 1827). See 3 J. KENT, COM-
MENTARm 353-55 (1st ed. 1828).
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consin spoke in terms of natural flow, the court in those cases fol-
lowed the reasonable use interpretation of the riparian doc-
trine,5 and in a parallel line of cases adopted reasonable use lan-
guage from the beginning to control diversion and obstruction situ-
ations.6
Under the reasonable use concept of riparianism, the reasonable-
ness of each use is measured by its relation to uses made by others
on the same watercourse. The amount of water each proprietor may
use is not fixed in volume and may vary with time. If there is not
enough water for all demands, all uses must be reduced until each is
again reasonable with respect to the others.
2. NUISANCE
The tort of nuisance involves injury to land resulting from certain
kinds of proscribed activities. Any person damaged as a result of
the proscribed activity may obtain relief under the doctrine.
7
There are two kinds of nuisance: private nuisance concerns inter-
ferences with the use and enjoyment of land; public nuisance re-
lates to interferences with rights common to everyone.
a. Private nuisance
Liability for private nuisance does not turn upon tortious con-
duct, but upon interference with private property interests. Pros-
ser has defined a private nuisance as:
an unreasonable interference with the interest in the use
and enjoyment of land. . . . It is distinguished from tres-
pass in that the interference is with use or enjoyment,
rather with the interest in exclusive possession.8
Private nuisances have included interferences with the physical
condition of land; disturbance of the comfort, convenience or health
of the occupant; disturbance of his peace of mind, or threat of future
injury; and activities causing flooding, raising the water table, pol-
luting a stream, and creating unpleasant odors, smoke, or gas.9
5. See, e.g. McEvoy v. Gallagher, 107 Wis. 331, 83 N.W. 633 (1900);
Kimberly & Clark Co. v. Hewitt, 75 Wis. 371, 44 N.W. 303 (1890); A.C. Conn
Co. v. Little Suamico Lumber Mfg. Co., 74 Wis. 652, 43 N.W. 660 (1889);
Mohr v. Gault, 10 Wis. 455 (1860).
6. See, e.g. Apfelbacher v. State, 167 Wis. 233, 167 N.W. 244 (1918);
Town of Lawrence v. American Writing Paper Co., 144 Wis. 556, 128 N.W.
440 (1911); Falls Mfg. Co. v. Oconto River Imp. Co., 87 Wis. 134, 58 N.W.
257 (1894); Fox River Flour & Paper Co. v. Kelley, 70 Wis. 287, 35 N.W.
744 (1887); Coldwell v. Sanderson, 69 Wis. 52, 28 N.W. 232, 33 N.W. 591
(1887); Lawson v. Mowry, 52 Wis. 219, 9 N.W. 280 (1881); Timm v. Bear,
29 Wis. 254 (1871); Mabie v. Matteson, 17 Wis. 1 (1863).
7. Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 738-
744 (1970).
8. W. PROSSER, TORTs 405 (2d ed. 1955).
9. Id. at 406,
[VOL. 1971:738
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In general, the reasonableness of the interference is determined
by balancing the harm to plaintiff against the utility of the de-
fendant's undertaking. In water pollution cases, however, many
states have rejected this balancing test, making special damage and
threat of substantial harm the primary determinants of reasonable-
ness.
b. Public nuisance
Prosser has defined a public nuisance as: "an act or omission
which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in
the exercise of rights common to all."' 0 This definition of public
nuisance comprehends a miscellaneous and diversified collection of
minor crimes and interferences with the public health, public safety,
public morals, public peace, public comfort and public convenience.
It includes, for example, the maintenance of a hogpen or malarial
pond, creation of bad odors, smoke and dust, and obstruction of a
navigable stream." Usually, public nuisance actions must be
brought by the state, unless a private individual has suffered spe-
cial damage differing in degree and kind from that suffered by the
public at large, in which case he may bring the action himself.' 2
B. Conceptual Confusion
As legal theories, riparian rights and nuisance overlap. Riparian
rights are usufructuary; that is, a landowner has a right to the use
and enjoyment of water flowing in a watercourse abutting his land,
but he has no right to exclusive possession of the water." Thus, a
defendant who has infringed a riparian right may have also engaged
in a nuisance, an unreasonable interference with a riparian's interest
in the use and enjoyment of his land.
Violations of riparian rights and creation of nuisances may also
overlap factually. Water pollution affecting the water supply used
by a farmer for domestic, household, and stockwatering purposes
may be both. If he is not able to use the water as he did before, the
polluting activity is unreasonable with respect to his own use of
water and constitutes a violation of riparian rights. Because the
pollution disturbs the comfort, convenience, or health of his habita-
tion, it constitutes an interference with the use and enjoyment of his
own land and is a private nuisance.
The congruity of the riparian rights and nuisance violations in the
majority of water pollution situations is a major cause of confusion
10. Id. at 401.
11. Id. at 401-2.
12. Id. at 403-5.
13. See, e.g., Munninghoff v. Wisconsin Conservation Comm'n, 255 Wis.
252, 259, 38 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1949); Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474
(No. 14,312) (C.C.D.R.I. 1827); Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. 492, 494 (1842).
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in the cases: since most cases can be decided on an amalgam of the
two theories, courts are unprepared to handle the unusual case
where only one theory applies. The usual water pollution case con-
cerns domestic, farm, or municipal pollution and includes the crea-
tion of nuisance conditions. In the less usual case, often involving
industrial pollution, nuisance conditions may not exist. Discharge
of industrial wastes for example does not always create odors. If
fouling of a riparian's domestic or livestock water supply is not an
element of the case, the industrial pollution will not constitute a nui-
sance. But it might nonetheless constitute a violation of riparian
rights if it deprives a riparian of the opportunity to make a reason-
able use of water.
C. Riparian Rights and Nuisance Distinguished
It is the hypothesis of this article that distinguishing between nui-
sance and riparian rights should have important consequences in
water pollution litigation. Nuisance doctrine ought to apply only
to traditional nuisance fact situations, such as severe degradation of
domestic or livestock water supplies, interference with habitation
by noxious odors rising from polluted water, or degradation of the
utility of land. The riparian rights doctrine should control in all
other situations. Under the reasonable use concept, a riparian has
a right to discharge wastes to a reasonable extent with respect to
other riparian users, even if that discharge causes pollution of the
watercourse. The cases recognize such a riparian right whenever
traditonal nuisance conditions do not exist. 14
1. ANALYSIS OF WATER POLLUTION CASES
An examinaton of all water pollution cases which could be
found in jurisdictions following riparian law reveals 445 American
cases which can be catagorized as riparian rights or as nuisance. 15
All of them were classified for this study on the basis of either the
plaintiff's allegations or the court's announced controlling doctrine.
If plaintiff's theory of action was not stated or was unclear and there
was ambiguity in the ratio decidendi-courts often spoke of both
riparian rights and nuisance without stating which controlled-the
case was classified according to the fact situation. If traditional nui-
sance conditions were involved, the case was classified as a nuisance
case. If no traditional nuisance condition was involved, the case
was classified as a riparian rights case. That analysis yielded 137
14. This analysis of water pollution litigation involves rights among
riparian landowners only. In no way does it reflect the rights of members
of the public to use water for fishing, swimming, boating, etc., or the power
of the states or federal government to regulate use of watercourses under
their police power.
15. See Appendix A.
[VOL. 1971:738
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riparian rights cases in 32 jurisdictions,' " 233 private nuisance cases
in 39 jurisdictions, 17 and 75 public nuisance cases in 26 jurisdic-
tions.'
Courts are by no means unanimously clear in distinguishing be-
tween the riparian rights and private nuisance theories of action.
Where confusion exists, it often involves a mixing of the natural
flow concept of riparian rights and of private nuisance doctrine.
The Wisconsin court fell into that confusion in Middlestadt v.
Waupaca Starch & Potato Co., where it said: 19
[A] riparian owner of property is entitled to have the water
of a stream flow to and through or by his land in its natural
purity and. . . anything done which so pollutes such water
as to impair its value for the purposes forwhich it is ordi-
narily used by persons so circumstanced, causing offensive
odors to arise therefrom and injuriously affecting the bene-
ficial enjoyment of adjoining property, may be restrained at
the suit of the injured party . . . . [emphasis added]
Citing a Scottish starch factory case,20 the court denominated offen-
sive odors cases as actionable nuisances. 2'
The Wisconsin court is not alone in mixing natural flow and
private nuisance language. A classic statement of the confusion is
contained in City of Kewanee v. Otley:22
Every owner of land through which a stream of water flows
is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the water, and to
have the same flow in its natural and accustomed course,
without obstruction, diversion or corruption. The right
extends to the quality as well as the quantity of the water.
The court of chancery has a concurrent jurisdiction with
courts of law, by injunction, equally clear and well estab-
lished in cases of private nuisances, and it is a familiar ex-
ercise of the power of the court to prevent, by injunction,
injuries to water-courses by obstruction or diversion ...
A disturbance or deprivation of that right [to the use and
enjoyment of the water in its natural state] is an irre-
parable injury, for which an injunction will issue ...
Where the nuisance operates to destroy health or to di-
minish the comfort of a dwelling, an action at law furnishes
16. Id.
17. See Appendix B. Of these, 14 cases with ambiguous ratio decidendi
and 43 cases not stating a theory of decision, are classified as private nui-
sance cases on the basis of fact situations. Cases with ambiguous court
language are noted. Cases in which no theory of decision was expressed
are designated "by implication."
18. See Appendix C.
19. 93 Wis. 1, 4, 66 N.W. 713, 714 (1896).
20. Robertson v. Stewart, [1872] 11 Sess. Cas. (3d ser.) 189 (Scot.).
21. Middlestadt v. Waupaca Starch & Potato Co., 93 Wis. 1, 5, 66 N.W.
713, 714 (1896).
22. 204 Ill. 402, 409, 68 N.E. 388, 390-91 (1903), quoting Holsman v.
Boiling Spring Bleaching Co., 14 N.J. Eq. 335, 342-43 (Ch. 1862).
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no adequate remedy and the party injured is entitled to
protection by injunction....
Other courts, as well, have confused the natural flow theory of
riparian rights with private nuisance ideas.23 The reasonable use
concept of riparian rights and private nuisance doctrine are con-
fused almost as frequently. The Alabama court, for example, said
in Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co. v. Turner:24
[E]very riparian proprietor has an equal right to have
the stream flow through his land in its natural state, with-
out material diminution in quantity, or alteration in qual-
ity .... Any diversion or obstruction of the water which
substantially diminishes the volume of the stream, so that
it does not flow ut currere solebat, or which defiles and cor-
rupts it to such a degree as essentially to impair its purity
and prevent the use of it for any of the reasonable and
proper purposes to which running water is usually applied,
such as irrigation, the propulsion of machinery, or con-
sumption for domestic use, is an infringement of the rights
of the owner of the land through which a water course
runs, and creates a nuisance for which those thereby in-jured are entitled to a recovery. 25  [emphasis added]
A few courts have compounded the confusion by mixing up all
three concepts, natural flow, reasonable use, and private nuisance,
without indicating which determined the decison.26
23. For example, in Peterson v. City of Santa Rosa, 119 Cal. 387, 392,
51 P. 557, 559 (1897), the court said:
Her right as a riparian owner was, not only to have the water of the
stream flow over her land in its usual volume, but to have it flow in
its natural purity, and such pollution of the stream by the defendant
as substantially impaired its value for the ordinary purposes of life,
and render it measurably unfit for domestic purposes, is an action-
able nuisance, . . . [sic.]
See also Vickers v. City of Fitzgerald, 216 Ga. 476, 480-81, 117 S.E.2d 316,
319 (1960); Hodges v. Pine Prod. Co., 135 Ga. 134, 136-37, 68 S.E. 1107,
1108 (1910); Coretti v. Broring Building Co., 150 Md. 198, 205-06, 132 A. 619,
622 (1926); Neubauer v. Overlea Realty Co., 142 Md. 87, 98, 120 A. 69, 73(1923); Barton v. Union Cattle Co., 28 Neb. 350, 356-57, 44 N.W. 454, 455-56
(1889); City of Mansfield v. Balliett, 65 Ohio St. 451, 466-67, 63 N.E. 86,
90-91 (1902); Sussex Land & Livestock Co. v. Midwest Ref. Co., 294 F.
597, 603-04 (8th Cir. 1923); Haigh v. Deudraeth Rural Dist. Council,
[1945] 2 All E.R. 661, 662 (Ch.).
24. 145 Ala. 639, 649-50, 39 So. 603, 605 (1905). Note that the first sen-
tence of this quotation is an example of a statement of natural flow lan-
guage in a reasonable use case.
25. See also Platt Bros. & Co. v. City of Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531, 547,
45 A. 154, 161 (1900); Muncie Pulp Co. v. Koontz, 33 Ind. App. 532, 536-38,
70 N.E. 999, 1004 (1904); Carhart v. Auburn Gas Light Co., 22 Barb. 297,
311-12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856); Butler v. Village of White Plains, 59 App. Div.
30, 33-34, 69 N.Y.S. 193, 195-96 (1901).
26. See Baltimore v. Warren Mfg. Co., 59 Md. 96, 106-09 (1882); South-
land Co. v. Aaron, 221 Miss. 59, 72-73, 72 So. 2d 161, 165-66 (1954); Trevett
v. Prison Ass'n, 98 Va. 332, 336-37, 36 S.E. 373, 374 (1900); Hazeltine v.
Case, 46 Wis. 391, 394, 1 N.W. 66 (1879).
[VOL. 1971:738
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When the fact situations of the cases are divided into traditional
nuisance and non-nuisance categories, it can be seen that both
natural flow and reasonable use concepts are employed in tradi-
tional nuisance and non-nuisance situations. By contrast, nuisance
law is predominantly used for traditional nuisance situations, al-
though it is used for a significant number of traditional non-nuisance
situations as well. 2
7
2. THE ELEMENTS OF THE NATURAL FLOW, REASONABLE
USE AND NUISANCE CONCEPTS
A defendant who has discharged waste into rivers ought to be
held to different standards of conduct depending upon whether the
litigation is framed as a riparian rights or a nuisance action. To un-
derstand why different standards should be applied, one must dis-
tinguish the elements of the various concepts and the types of fact
situations to which each should apply.
a. Natural flow concept
Strict natural flow and reasonable use definitions of riparian
rights are incompatible. The former insists upon no adulteration of
water quality and upon absolute maintenance of natural purity.
The latter allows a reasonable use of water, even if some lessening
of quality occurs. Unfortunately, none of the water pollution cases
examined give a rationale for adopting the natural flow concept.
Instead, they repeat the traditional language of natural purity
27. Traditional nuisance situations
Riparian rights law 66
Private nuisance law 199
Total 265
Non-nuisance situations
Riparian rights law 71
Private nuisance law 34
Total 105
Natural flow decisions








Traditional nuisance situations 199
Non-nuisance situations 34
Total 233
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without further illumination. The language in City of Richmond v.
Test is typical: 28
The principle is well settled, that in the absence of grant,
license, or prescription limiting his rights, a riparian pro-
prietor has the right to have the waters of a natural water
course flow along or through his premises as it would nat-
urally flow, without change of quantity or quality.
In other words, a riparian has no right to discharge wastes if doing
so lessens the quality of the water.
Richmond v. Test is one of only 14 American cases in which the
fact situation does not involve elements of traditional nuisance, and
in which the decision is grounded upon natural flow. 29 The exist-
ence of such cases clearly indicates that natural flow is a distinct
concept, albeit not a very popular one. The opinions were not con-
cerned with the kinds of considerations present when a man is likely
to be driven from his home or prevented from farming his land.
In these cases, the polluter and the polluted were on much the same
footing, often engaged in the same type of business, and the natural
flow rationale apparently was chosen because it reflected the courts'
feelings about the relative rights of similar riparian owners. In
those circumstances, the rationale could not be chosen merely to
disguise a decision based on nuisance considerations.
The choice between natural flow and reasonable use, if the choice
is a conscious one, will affect the opportunities to open new indus-
tries downstream from old ones or to maintain old industries in
the face of new ones established upstream. Natural flow perforce
must favor the downstream user and prevent any polluting use up-
stream, regardless of the age of the industry. Reasonable use, on
the other hand, favors the upstream user to the extent that it al-
lows any reasonable use to be established at any location on a river,
and requires all users to accommodate it.
b. Reasonab'le use concept
Apparently, many courts have favored the reasonable use concept
over natural flow because it favors economic and industrial
growth:30
[The riparian right] is not an absolute right, but a natural
one, qualified and limited, like all natural rights, by the
existence of like rights in others. It is incident merely to his
ownership of land through which the stream has its course.
As such owner he has the right to enjoy the continued flow
of the stream, to use its force, and to make limited and tem-
28. 18 Ind. App. 482, 493, 48 N.E. 610, 614 (1897). See also H.B. Bowling
Coal Co. v. Ruffner, 117 Tenn. 180, 189-90, 100 S.W. 116, 119 (1906).
29. See Appendix A(1).
30. Merrifield v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216, 219 (1872).
[VoL. 1971:738
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porary appropriation of its waters. These rights are held
in common with all others having lands bordering upon the
same stream; but his enjoyment must necessarily be ac-
cording to his opportunity, prior to those below him, sub-
sequent to those above. It follows that all such rights are
liable to be modified and abridged in the enjoyment, by the
exercise by others of their own rights . . . . The only limit
that can be set to this abridgment through the exercise by
others of their natural rights, is in the standard or mea-
sure of reasonable use ....
So the natural right . . . to have the water descend to
[a riparian] in its pure state, fit to be used for the various
purposes to which he may have occasion to apply it, must
yield to the equal right in those who happen to be above
him. Their use of the stream for mill purposes, for irriga-
tion, watering cattle, and the manifold purposes for which
they may lawfully use it, will tend to render the water
more or less impure. Cultivating and fertilizing the lands
bordering on the stream, and in which are its sources, their
occupation by farm-houses and other erections, will un-
avoidably cause impurities to be carried into the stream.
As the lands are subdivided and their occupation and use
become multifarious, these causes will be rendered more
operative, and their effects more perceptible. The water
may thus be rendered unfit for many uses for which it had
before been suitable; -but so far as that condition results
only from reasonable use of the stream in accordance with
the common right, the lower riparian proprietor has no
remedy.31
The reasonable use approach, as first formulated in Tyler v. Wil-
kinson, 2 emphasizes each riparian proprietor's co-equal right to
use the water. Thus, the definition of reasonable use depends upon
the characteristics of the watercourse, the uses to which all riparians
intend to put it, and the extent to which use by one landowner in-
terferes with that of others.
An unreasonable discharge of wastes has been defined as one
causing an appreciable or substantial injury upon other riparians,
not merely a slight inconvenience or occasional annoyance.3 3  In
31. See also Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Hamilton, 100 Ala. 252,
258-60, 14 So. 167, 169-70 (1893); Lockwood v. Lawrence, 77 Me. 297, 316-17
(1885); Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 598-99, 81 N.E.
468 (1907); Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459, 461-63 (1856).
32. 24 F. Cas. 472 (No. 14,312) (C.C.D.R.I. 1827).
33. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Hamilton, 100 Ala. 252, 260, 14
So. 167, 170 (1893); Tetherington v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 232 Ill.
522, 525, 83 N.E. 1048, 1049 (1908); Voss v. Chicago Sandoval Coal Co.,
165 Ill. App. 565, 570 (1911); Muncie Pulp Co. v. Koontz, 33 Ind. App. 532,
537, 70 N.E. 999, 1004 (1904); Kennedy v. Moog Servocontrols, Inc., 48
Misc. 2d 107, 264 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613-14 (Sup. Ct. 1965), modified, 26 App.
Div. 2d 768, 271 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1966), aff'd mem., 21 N.Y.2d 966, 237 N.E.2d
356, 290 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1968); Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459, 462 (1856).
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determining what is reasonable, the court or jury may consider all
factors which seem pertinent:
The decision of this question depend[s] not alone upon
the extent and nature of the impurities projected into [the]
stream, but upon the location of plaintiff's land, the use to
which it [is] devoted, the effect upon it of any impurities
in the stream, and the extent to which the pollution of the
waters may [be] attributable to other sources and causes
than those charged in the complaint. Surrounding
circumstances, such as the size and velocity of the stream,
the usage of the country, the extent of the injury, conven-
ience in doing business, and the indispensable public neces-
sity of cities and villages for drainage, are also taken into
consideration, so that a use which under certain circum-
stances is held reasonable under different circumstances
would be held unreasonable.34
Unlike the natural flow concept, reasonable use allows a riparian
to discharge some wastes into a watercourse, provided that the
amount or toxicity of the discharge is not deemed unreasonable.
The defendant's need to discharge wastes must be balanced against
the needs of other riparians.
A right to discharge wastes has been sustained in 30 cases,
grounded upon reasonable use concepts.3 5  The right to discharge
wastes was recognized expressly in five of those decisions.3 6 Only
one case rejected the notion,3 7 and that one, perforce, runs contrary
to the reasonable use doctrine it expressly affirms. The language of
two of the cases is illustrative. In an Iowa case where sugar beet re-
fuse polluted a livestock water supply, the court found for the waste
discharger, saying, "The upper owner may, as a rule, use the stream
in a reasonable manner, for reasonable purposes, even as a means of
carrying off waste matter. '3 8 In a Maine case where sawmill debris
plugged up millwheels, the court held for the defendant and com-
mented, "The defendant had a right to the use of the water above
34. Reese v. City of Johnstown, 45 Misc. 432, 92 N.Y.S. 728, 729 (Sup.
Ct. 1904), quoting Townsend v. Bell, 167 N.Y. 462, 471, 60 N.E. 757, 760(1901); and Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 321, 58 N.E. 142, 147
(1900). See also Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, 30 Minn. 249, 253-54,
15 N.W. 167, 168-69 (1883); Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N.H. 580, 584-85 (1863).
35. See cases in Appendix A(3)-(5).
36. Donnelly Brick Co. v. City of New Britain, 106 Conn. 167, 175, 137
A. 745, 748 (1927) (stated negatively); Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co.,
77 Iowa 576, 578, 42 N.W. 448, 449 (1889); Dwinel v. Veazie, 44 Me. 167,
175 (1857); Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N.H. 580, 585 (1863); George v. Village of
Chester, 59 Misc. 553, 111 N.Y.S. 722, 724 (Sup. Ct. 1908), aff'd mem.,
137 App. Div. 889, 121 N.Y.S. 1131 (1910), modified, 202 N.Y. 398, 400-01,
95 N.E. 767, 768 (1911).
37. Auger & Simon Silk Dyeing Co. v. East Jersey Water Co., 88 N.J.L.
273, 274-75, 96 A. 60, 61 (1915) (where plaintiff sought to enjoin a non-
riparian public water supply diversion so it could discharge wastes).
38. Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576, 578, 42 N.W. 448, 449
(1889).
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his mills, to float logs to them, and also to the use of the water be-
low them, to float rafts and lumber to market, and also to float
away the waste stuff from his mills, so far as such use was reason-
able and conformable to the usages and wants of the community."3 9
c. Private nuisance concept
Private nuisance is the doctrine followed in the majority of water
pollution cases.40  A private nuisance is any non-trespassory act
which impairs the fitness of land for "the ordinary uses of life,"41
or any act which produces "a condition actually destructive of
physical comfort or health, or a tangible, visible injury to prop-
erty. ' 42 The most comprehensive definition of a private nuisance
as it relates to water pollution is provided by Trevett v. Prison As-
sociation:
[S]uch impurities as substantially impair [the water's]
value for the ordinary purposes of life, and render it meas-
urably unfit for domestic purposes; or such as causes un-
wholesome or offensive vapors or odors to arise from the
water, and thus impairs the comfortable or beneficial en-
joyment of property in its vicinity, or such as, while pro-
ducing no actual sensible effect upon the water, are yet of
a character calculated to disgust the senses, such as the de-
posit of the carcasses of dead animals therein, or the erec-
tion of privies over a stream, or any other use calculated to
produce nausea or disgust in those using the water for the
ordinary purposes of life. .... 43
39. Dwinel v. Veazie, 44 Me. 167, 175 (1857). Whether the right to dis-
charge wastes under the reasonable use doctrine creates a property right
which must be compensated for when curtailed by public regulation is be-
yond the scope of this article. The situation could be as complex consti-
tutionally as the conflicting doctrine concerning the power of the state to
prohibit swimming in natural watercourses that are used as sources of pub-
lic water supplies. Compare cases holding that statutes or ordinances pro-
hibiting bathing by riparians are unconstitutional: City of Battle Creek v.
Goguac Resort Ass'n, 181 Mich. 241, 148 N.W. 441 (1914); People v. Hulbert,
131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211 (1902); George v. Village of Chester, 59 Misc.
553, 111 N.Y.S. 722 (Sup. Ct. 1908), aff'd mem., 137 App. Div. 889, 121 N.Y.S.
1131 (1910), modified, 202 N.Y. 398, 95 N.E. 767 (1911); Bino v. City of
Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76 N.W.2d 571 (1956); with those holding that such
statutes are constitutional: Harvey Realty Co. v. Borough of Wallingford,
111 Conn. 352, 150 A. 60 (1930); State v. Heller, 123 Conn. 492, 196 A. 337
(1937); State v. Morse, 84 Vt. 387, 80 A. 194 (1911).
40. There were 233 private nuisance cases, 137 riparian rights cases, and
75 public nuisance cases. Of those 233 cases, 188 expressly followed private
nuisance theory, while 45 used it by implication from the facts. See Appen-
dix D.
41. Baltimore v. Warren Mfg. Co., 59 Md. 96, 110 (1882). See also Nolan
v. City of New Britain, 69 Conn. 668, 678, 38 A. 703, 706 (1897).
42. Bowman v. Humphrey, 124 Iowa 744, 746, 100 N.W. 854, 855 (1904).
See also Perry v. Howe Co-op. Creamery Co., 125 Iowa 415, 418, 101 N.W.
150, 151 (1904).
43. 98 Va. 332, 336, 36 S.E. 373, 374 (1900), quoting 1 H. WooD, Nui-
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An analysis of the fact situations of water pollution cases supports
this definition. The degradation of water quality is actionable not
in itself but because it impairs the use of land, primarily by mak-
ing it less habitable.
Whether a case can be decided according to private nuisance con-
cepts rather than riparian rights ought to depend upon the fact situ-
ation.44 Water pollution that interferes with habitation, with occu-
pation of buildings,45 or with non-irrigated farming is considered
a nuisance. Interference with industrial users of water, however,
does not fall within nuisance categories. While half the cases in-
volving interference with irrigation have been classified in each
category, it ought to be considered a non-nuisance situation because
it, like manufacturing, is an "artificial" or "extraordinary" use of
water under the common law.4 6
The relationship of private nuisance law to the riparian rights
doctrine has been discussed in very few cases, although the concepts
have often been used simultaneously.47 Three cases have indicated
that riparian rights law operates in all water pollution situations
and that nuisance is a limitation, applicable in certain fact situa-
tions, on the riparian's right to make reasonable use of water, in-
cluding the discharge of wastes.48
d. Public nuisance
The common law recognizes rights in the public to be free from
certain forms of interference with the public safety, public health,
public morals, public peace, public comfort, and public convenience.
These are comprehended collectively as public nuisance law.
Public nuisance law has been applied in 75 water pollution
SANCES § 427 (3d ed. 1893). See also Muncie Pulp Co. v. Martin, 23 Ind.
App. 558, 559-60, 55 N.E. 796, 796-97 (1899), afI'd 164 Ind. 30, 72 N.E. 882(1904); Jeakins v. City of El Dorado, 143 Kan. 206, 209-10, 53 P.2d 798,
800 (1936).
44. For an indication of the number of cases classified by the courts ac-
cording to their fact situation as private nuisance and as riparian rights,
see list of codings on p. 321, infra, coded in Appendices A and B, using
the numbers on the list.
45. One case restricts nuisance to interferences with habitation and ex-
cludes interferences with occupation of other buildings. See Edwards v.
Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46, 50-51 (1878). In view of the 4 cases of
interference with factories and businesses which the courts have decided on
private nuisance doctrine, that assertion must be incorrect. Only one such
case was decided under riparian rights law.
46. Smith v. Corbit, 116 Cal. 587, 48 P. 725 (1897); Evans v. Merri-
weather, 4 Ill. 492 (1842) (dictum); Frizwell v. Bindley, 144 Kan. 84, 58
P.2d 95 (1936) (by implication). See 2 H. FARNHAM, LAW OF WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS 1580-82 (1904); 3 H. FARNHAM, LAW OF WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS 1898-1900 (1904).
47. See note 26 supra, and accompanying text.
48. Lawton v. Herrick, 83 Conn. 417, 424, 76 A. 986, 989 (1910); O'Riley
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cases,4 9 but, because of the potpourri character and quasi-criminal
origins of public nuisance law, no single definition exists. Many of
the water pollution cases involve odors in residential areas, pollu-
tion of public, domestic, or livestock water supplies, and undiffer-
entiated stream pollution.50
Under the common law, actions to abate a public nuisance can be
brought either by the state or, in certain situations, by a private in-
dividual. For an individual to bring an action to abate a public
nuisance, he must suffer injury which is different in kind and de-
gree from that suffered by the public at large.5 1
The common law rules concerning who may bring an action to
abate a public nuisance have been modified substantially by statute
in Wisconsin. 52 Section 280.02 empowers (1) private individuals and
counties to bring actions to abate public nuisances upon leave of the
court, (2) the attorney general to bring actions on his own informa-
tion, and (3) cities, villages and towns to bring them in their own
names without leave of the court. This section has been interpreted
to mean that a private individual may bring an action to abate a
public nuisance without a showing of special damage.
5 3
Certain acts have been declared public nuisances by statute, in-
v. McChesney, 3 Lans. 278, 282 (Supp. Ct. 1870), alf'd mem. 49 N.Y. 672
(1872); Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo, 273 N.Y. 119,
128, 7 N.E.2d 10, 13 (1937).
49. See Appendix D. In addition, there are 12 public nuisance cases in
England, Wales, and Ireland.
50. Totalling 57 cases. See Appendix D.
51. Nolan v. City of New Britain, 69 Conn. 668, 38 A. 703 (1897); Bair v.
Central & So. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 144 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1962). An in-
dividual must suffer special damage which is different in kind and degree
from that suffered by the public in order to be able to bring an action to
abate a public nuisance. WiS. STAT. § 280.01 (1969); Costas v. City of Fond
du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 413-14, 129 N.W.2d 217, 219-20 (1963); Otherwise the
action must be brought by the state. WIs. STAT. § 280.02 (1969); Meiners v.
Frederick Miller Brewing Co., 78 Wis. 364, 366, 47 N.W. 430 (1890); Greene
v. Nunnemacher, 36 Wis. 50, 55, 58 (1874). The courts have recognized sub-
stantial interference with an individual's use of his land (that is, an injury
creating a cause of action for a private nuisance), personal injuries, pre-
vention of performance of a contract, deprivation of business customers,
as sufficient to confer standing to sue for abatement of or damages from a
public nuisance. See W. PROSSER, TORTS, 401, 404-5 (2d ed. 1955), and
Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COL. L. REV. 735, 740 (1970).
52. WiS. STAT. § 280.02 (1969). The statute was enacted in 1905 to allow
private individuals to bring actions with leave of the court to abate public
nuisances without showing special damage. Ch. 145, § 1, [1905] Wis. Laws
217. Cities, villages and towns were empowered to bring actions with
leave of the court by ch. 423, § 2, [1939] Wis. Laws 673. Those units of
government were empowered to bring actions in their own names with-
out leave of the court in 1943, and in the same year, counties were em-
powered to bring them with leave. Ch. 66, § 16, [1943] Wis. Laws 78.
53. State ex rel. Cowie v. La Crosse Theater Co., 232 Wis. 153, 286 N.W.
707 (1939).
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cluding maintenance of improper sewage disposal facilities,54 ob-
structions in navigable waters, 55 and discharge of noxious matter
onto highways or into surface waters. 6 Under section 280.02, a pri-
vate individual may bring an action to abate them without showing
special damages.
Section 144.536, which declares noncompliance with pollution
abatement orders a public nuisance, 7 may not fall within the pur-
view of section 280.02, however.58 The section's language appears to
give the attorney general exclusive jurisdiction to enforce pollu-
tion abatement orders; noncompliance is made a public nuisance by
this statute solely for the purpose of enforcement proceedings
brought by him.59 Thus, an individual may have to show special
damages if he wishes to bring suit using this statute.
3. SUMMARY OF CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES
The outcome of a water pollution case may vary, depending upon
whether riparian rights or nuisance law has been followed, because
the concepts involve different fact situations and different bases for
determining allowable waste discharge. First, whereas riparian
rights is concerned with the use of water in a watercourse, private
nuisance involves interferences with the use and enjoyment of land.
Second, private nuisance law ought to apply only to traditional
54. WIS. STAT. § 146.14(1) (1969).
55. WIs. STAT. §§ 31.23-.25 (1969).
56. WIS. STAT. § 146.13 (1969).
57. WIS. STAT. § 144.536 (1969) reads:
All orders of the [Natural Resources] department shall be enforced
by the attorney general. The circuit court of Dane county or any
other county where violation of such an order has occurred in whole
or in part shall have jurisdiction to enforce the order by injunctional
and other relief appropriate to the enforcement of the order. For
purposes of such proceeding where the order prohibits in whole or in
part any pollution, a violation thereof shall be deemed a public
nuisance ...
58. Carmichael took this view. D. CARMICHAEL, Forty Years of Water
Pollution Control in Wisconsin: A Case Study, 1967 WIs. L. REv. 350,
390-91.
59. The statement in the section deeming noncompliance a public nui-
sance is not superfluous. Unless it gives the attorney general no benefit,
the language should not be construed to Create jurisdiction to enforce or-
ders in persons other than the attorney general. In fact, declaring noncom-
pliance a public nuisance shortens from 30 days to 5 days the period in
which the stay of judgment can be obtained pending a decision whether to
appeal the circuit court judgment. WIs. STAT. § 280.02 (1969). The five-
day rule assures speedy abatement of nuisances and that the appeal pro-
cedure will not be used to delay compliance. This rule established by stat-
ute appears to be the only benefit the attorney general receives by the
declaration that noncompliance with a pollution abatement order is a public
nuisance. It is a sufficient benefit, however, to construe the statement as
being nonsuperfluous. Therefore the language giving the attorney general
authority to enforce such orders may be construed as being exclusive and
not subject to section 280.02.
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nuisance fact situations. The courts ought to ground their decisions
upon riparian rights law, except where a nuisance has been created.
The courts have defined severe degradation of livestock or domestic
water supplies, noxious odors, and interference with the utility of
land as nuisance situations. In a few cases, fact situations within
these private nuisance categories have been classified as riparian
rights. In cases whose fact situations are clearly outside nuisance
categories, 53 were classified by the courts as riparian rights and
only 10 as private nuisance.
Third, the natural flow concept of riparian rights is a distinctly
minority interpretation; of 137 riparian rights decisions, only 35 are
grounded upon natural flow.60 Thus, in most jurisdictions, a ripar-
ian owner shares equally with other riparians on the watercourse
the right to discharge wastes into the river. The right is limited by
the uses of the river made by other riparians, by the stricture
against creating a private nuisance, by common law and statutory
definitions of public nuisance, and by the police power of the state
to regulate waste discharge by statute and administrative regula-
tion.
II. RIPARIAN RIGHTS AND THE DISCHARGE OF WASTES
Whether the riparian's right to use river water extends to waste
disposal ought to depend upon whether a court follows the reason-
able use or natural flow test. Under the reasonable use test, waste
discharge should be permitted, so long as it is reasonable in relation
to uses of the water by other riparians. Under the natural flow con-
cept, however, no alteration of a stream's purity should be allowed.
Wisconsin cases are not clear on this question, and highlight the
doctrinal confusion existing in many riparian states. Although one
Wisconsin case strongly suggested that the reasonable use concept
should be applied to pollution situations,6 1 two others, one earlier62
and one later, expressly rejected that concept in pollution cases.
Further, although several cases recognize that industrialization and
urbanization must inevitably cause a degradation of water quality,63
none of those cases held the polluter to a less than natural purity
60. See Appendix D.
61. In Hazeltine v. Case, 46 Wis. 391, 394, 1 N.W. 66 (1879), involving
pollution from a hogyard, the court said:
[E]ach riparian proprietor was entitled to the use and enjoyment of
the stream in its natural flow, subject to its reasonable use by other
proprietors; . . . each proprietor had an equal right to the use of the
stream for the ordinary purposes of his house and farm, and for the
purpose of watering his stock, even though such use might, in some
degree, lessen the volume of the stream or affect the purity of the
water ....
62. Greene v. Nunnemacher, 36 Wis. 50, 56 (1874).
63. Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 107-08, 85 N.W. 668, 670
(1901); Tiede v. Schneidt, 105 Wis. 470, 479-80, 81 N.W. 826, 829 (1900).
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standard.6 4 In fact, the court has held that only the legislature can
change the rule in view of the paramount property rights in-
volved.6 5
In order to understand the extent of riparian rights, it is neces-
say to define riparian land and the circumstances under which
riparians and non-riparians may discard wastes into river water.
A. Rights of Riparians
1. DEFINITION OF RIPARIAN LAND
Riparians are landowners, or their lessees, whose land abuts on a
watercourse. 66 How much of the abutting land is riparian has never
been settled in Wisconsin. 7 Two rules have been followed in the
United States. The "source of title" rule includes as riparian only
that which borders on a lake or stream and has been in the same
ownership in an uninterrupted chain of title from the original gov-
ernment patent. While it is generally considered to be the majority
rule, the only cases supporting the "source of title" rule are in west-
64. Briggson v. City of Viroqua, 264 Wis. 47, 52-54, 58 N.W.2d 546, 549
(1953); Mitchell Realty Co. v. City of West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 362, 199
N.W. 390, 393 (1924); Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 107-08,
85 N.W. 668, 670 (1901).
65. In Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 107-08, 85 N.W. 668,
670 (1901), the court held:
We cannot but recognize that, as the density of our population
increases, as our citizens engage in new and greater industries, and
as the municipal aggregations of population multiply and expand, the
original purity of the streams and water basins cannot be wholly
preserved. They are the natural and unavoidable courses and re-
ceptacles of drainage, through and into which must flow the refuse
of human habitation and industry. How far these changing condi-
tions must bring about a yielding of the private rights of continued
purity of those lakes and streams to the necessity of use thereof for
the public and general health and convenience, and upon what terms
such yielding shall come, are primarily questions of policy for the
legislature, within the limits of its power over private rights defined
by the constitution. When, if ever, the legislature shall enact that
streams generally or any streams shall be so used as sewers without
liability to the owners of the soil through which they run, the
question of constitutional protection to [sic] private rights may be
forced upon the courts for decision. Until such enactment is made,
however, in clear and unambiguous terms, we shall be slow to hold
by inference or implication that it has been made at all. The right
of the riparian owner to the natural flow of water substantially un-
impaired in volume and purity is one of great value, and which the
law nowhere has more persistently recognized and jealously pro-
tected than in Wisconsin.
66. Colson v. Salzman, 272 Wis. 397, 75 N.W.2d 421 (1956); Hermansen
v. City of Lake Geneva, 272 Wis. 293, 75 N.W.2d 439 (1956); Diedrich v.
Northwestern Union Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 248 (1877).
67. OAKEY, PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ACTIVITIES UNDER THE PRESENT
WATER LAW 2-3 (Report to Subcommittee on Water Use Legislation, mimeo,
April 1957). See generally, OSTERHOUDT, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF WIs-
CONSIN'S DIVERSION PERMIT SYSTEM FOR AGRICULTURAL IRRIGATION 94-128
(Water Resources Center, University of Wisconsin, Report No. WRC 65-
006, 1967).
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ern states68 where prior appropriation is the dominant law of water
allocation. Perhaps the "source of title" rule is used to limit the
amount of water subject to residual riparian rights in order to free
it for appropriation.
The "unity of title" rule includes as riparian all parcels held in
common ownership contiguous to the abutting parcel. Although it
is considered the minority rule, all eastern states to consider the
question have adopted the "unity of title" rule, as have some western
states. 69
Ownership of riparian land encompasses two concomitant rights:
the right to use water in the river, and, in certain circumstances, the
right to stop others from using the water.
2. RIGHT OF RIPARIAN TO USE WATER ON NONRIPARIAN LAND
Wisconsin has not ruled on whether a riparian can use water on
nonriparian land. Although a majority of states considering the
question have decided that riparian rights may be exercised only
on riparian land,70 there is considerable authority for the contrary
rule. Most of the states following the minority rule allow such
nonriparian use of water only if lower riparians are not damaged.7 1
But two states allow it if the use is reasonable, 72 even though lower
riparians are damaged. However, there appears to be no case dis-
cussing a riparian's right to discharge wastes into a watercourse as
a result of activities on his nonriparian land. 73
The problem of defining riparian land may be largely academic so
68. Cases supporting this view include: Anaheim Union Water Co. v.
Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907); Boehmer v. Big Rock Creek Irrigation
Dist., 117 Cal. 19, 48 P. 908 (1897); Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex.
578, 86 S.W. 733 (1905); Yearsley v. Cater, 149 Wash. 285, 270 P. 804 (1928).
69. Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 80 P. 571 (1905); Elliot v. Fitchburg
R.R., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191 (1852); Wasserburger v. Coffee, 180 Neb.
149, 141 N.W.2d 738 (1966) (overruling a previous line of "source of title"
cases); Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore. 30, 64 P. 855 (1901); Consolidated Water
Supply Co. v. State Hosp., 66 Pa. Super. 610 (1917), aff'd 267 Pa. 29, 110 A.
281 (1920); Slack v. Marsh, 11 Phila. 543 (Pa. County Ct. 1875). Cf.
McCartney v. Londonderry & L.S. Ry., [1904] A.C. 501 (Ir.).
70. See, e.g., Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P.
978 (1907); Williams v. Wadsworth, 51 Conn. 277 (1884); Hendrix v. Rob-
erts Marble Co., 175 Ga. 389, 165 S.E. 223 (1932); Crawford Co. v. Hathaway,
67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903); McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co.,
70 N.J. Eq. 695, 65 A. 489 (1906), aff'd 209 U.S. 349 (1908); Scranton Gas &
Water Co. v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 240 Pa. 604, 88 A. 24 (1913); Town
of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921); Roberts v. Martin,
72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535 (1913).
71. See, e.g., Stratton v. Mt. Herman Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103
N.E. 87 (1913); Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 172 P.2d
1002 (1946); Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273 (1927).
72. Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 A. 18 (1892); Lawrie v. Silsby,
82 Vt. 505, 74 A. 94 (1909).
73. One case does hold that a riparian may not obtain relief for damage
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far as industrial or agricultural waste dischargers are concerned,
but it poses a very real question for municipalities. Seven munici-
pal diversion cases have held that riparian rights do not extend to
the entire municipality, but only to city-owned land on the water-
course. 74  Thus, a municipality must acquire its water rights by
purchase or eminent domain.75
However, for the purpose of discharging wastes, a municipality
may not need to acquire riparian land. The only two cases to dis-
cuss this question held that the municipality is a riparian for pur-
poses of discharging wastes.76
B. Rights of Nonriparians
Wisconsin has not decided whether riparian rights can be severed
from the lands to which they are attached and conveyed to non-
riparians. Several states have ruled such severance and convey-
ance is possible, whether by grant or reservation, 77 by lease,78 or by
license.79 Some courts will enforce the rights conveyed to non-
riparians against nonconsenting riparians,80 but a few will not.8 '
caused by pollution on his contiguous nonriparian land because he has no
right to use water on that land. Sun Co. v. Gibson, 295 F. 118 (5th Cir.
1923).
74. Wallace v. City of Winfield, 96 Kan. 35, 149 P. 693 (1915); Sparks
Mfg. Co. v. Town of Newton, 60 N.J. Eq. 399, 45 A. 596 (1900); Smith v.
City of Brooklyn, 160 N.Y. 357, 54 N.E. 787 (1899); Fischer v. Clifton
Springs, 121 N.Y.S. 163 (Sup. Ct. 1909), affd mem. 140 App. Div. 918,
125 N.Y.S. 1119 (1910); Smith v. Town of Morganton, 187 N.C. 801, 123
S.E. 88 (1924); Pernell v. City of Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E.2d 449(1941); Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942).
75. Three cases hold contra: City of Canton v. Shock, 66 Ohio St. 19,
63 N.E. 600 (1902); Mayor v. Commissioners, 7 Pa. 348 (1848); City of
Philadelphia v. Collins, 68 Pa. 106 (1871).
76. City of Valparaiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337, 54 N.E. 1062 (1899); City
of Cape Girardeau v. Hunze, 314 Mo. 438, 284 S.W. 471 (1926).
77. Miller & Lux, Inc. v. J.G. James Co., 179 Cal. 689, 178 P. 716 (1919);
Batavia Mfg. Co. v. Newton Wagon Co., 91 111. 230 (1878); Mandeville v.
Comstock, 9 Mich. 536 (1862); Lawrie v. Silsby, 82 Vt. 505, 74 A. 94 (1909);
Hite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va. 218, 8 S.E.2d 369 (1940).
78. Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 172 P.2d 1002 (1946);
Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273 (1927); Bergeron v. Forger,
125 Vt. 207, 214 A.2d 85 (1965).
79. Goodrich v. Burbank, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 459 (1866); Rerick v. Kern,
14 S. & R. 267 (Pa. 1826).
80. Spring Valley Water Co. v. County of Alameda, 88 Cal. App. 157,
263 P. 318 (1927); Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 A. 18 (1892); Smith v.
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 172 P.2d 1002 (1946); Lawrie v.
Silsby, 76 Vt. 240, 56 A. 1106 (1904), 82 Vt. 505, 74 A.94 (1909).
The appurtenant water right may be granted simultaneously with
the conveyance of a severed back tract and be enforced against noncon-
senting riparians. Miller & Lux, Inc. v. J. G. James Co., 179 Cal. 689, 178
P. 716 (1919); Frazee v. Railroad Comm'n, 185 Cal. 690, 201 P. 921 (1921)
(partition); St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 41
Minn. 270, 43 N.W. 56 (1889).
81. Heilbron v. Fowler Switch Canal Co., 75 Cal. 426, 17 P. 535 (1888);
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Very few cases discuss the corollary questions of whether a non-
riparian can purchase a riparian's right to divert water from a water-
course and whether he can bring an action to abate pollution of a
watercourse because it interferes with his use of its water. It seems
apparent that a nonriparian has no riparian rights in a watercourse
(unless he has purchased or otherwise legally acquired them), and
he cannot bring an action for violation of those rights.8 2 If, how-
ever, a nonriparian has purchased riparian rights, or otherwise has
a right to receive water from a watercourse, then, in the view of one
court at least, he has a right to seek relief from pollution of that
watercourse. 83 Other courts will not enforce the acquired rights of
nonriparians against nonconsenting riparian polluters.8 4  A non-
riparian may bring an action for private nuisance, if he is affected
by odors from a polluted watercourse.8 5
The case law on whether a nonriparian can acquire a right to
discharge wastes into a watercourse is even more sparse. A few
cases suggest that he cannot.8 6 Apparently, a nonriparian can dis-
charge raw wastes into a city sewer system, and if the city fails to
adequately treat the wastes the city, rather than the nonriparian,
will be liable for the injury.8 7 In this fashion a nonriparian can
Stockport Waterworks Co. v. Potter, 3 H. & C. 300, 159 Eng. Rep. 545
(Ex. 1864).
82. Masonite Corp. v. Burnham, 164 Miss. 840, 146 So. 292 (1933); Young
v. City of Asheville, 241 N.C. 618, 86 S.E.2d 408 (1955).
Nor does a nonriparian have a right to complain of a private nui-
sance because of pollution of water as such. Topeka Water Supply Co. v.
City of Potwin Place, 43 Kan. 404, 23 P. 578 (1889); Masonite Corp. v.
Burnham, 164 Miss. 840, 146 So. 292 (1933).
83. In Boyle v. Pure Oil Co., 16 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), a
nonriparian received water from a city water supply. An upstream ripar-
ian polluted the stream with salt water, rendering water supplied through
the city water system unfit for the nonriparian's ice plant. The court
granted damages on the grounds of negligence by the upstream riparian
and proximate cause.
Cf. Prairie Pipe Line Co. v. Dalton, 243 S.W. 619 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
84. Doremus v. City of Paterson, 65 N.J. Eq. 711, 55 A. 304 (1903), re-
versing 63 N.J. Eq. 605, 52 A. 1107 (Ch. 1902) (grantees of a riparian water
company do not have an enforceable right against upstream riparians for
unpolluted water); Egyptian Lacquer Mfg. Co. v. Chemical Co. of Am., 93
N.J.L. 305, 108 A. 249 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd mem. 94 N.J.L. 557, 111 A. 926
(1920) (plaintiff had a water supply contract with a city, whose water
supply became polluted); Stockport Water Works Co. v. Potter, 3 H. & C.
300, 159 Eng. Rep. 545 (Ex. 1864).
85. Masonite Corp. v. Burnham, 164 Miss. 840, 146 So. 292 (1933).
86. Harvey Realty Co. v. Borough of Wallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 150
A. 60 (1930); Stanton v. St. Joseph's College, 254 A.2d 597 (Me. 1969);
Sterling Iron & Zinc Co. v. Sparks Mfg. Co., 55 N.J. Eq. 824, 38 A. 426
(1897), afi'g sub nom. Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co., 54 N.J. Eq. 65,
33 A. 286 (Ch. 1895); McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N.C. 540, 58 S.E.2d 107
(1950).
87. Kraver v. Smith, 164 Ky. 674, 177 S.W. 286 (1915); Grey ex rel.
Simmons v. City of Paterson, 58 N.J. Eq. 1, 42 A. 749 (Ch. 1899), rev'd on
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acquire a right to pollute without liability. He would, of course,
be subject to sewer use regulations,88 and may be countersued by
the municipality.
C. Limits on the Riparian's Right to Stop Discharges
1. PRESCRIPTION
Prescription, more commonly known as adverse possession, in-
volves incidents to land not the right to possession itself.8 9 A pre-
scriptive property right, adverse and superior to the right of the
property owner, can be acquired by open, notorious, uninterrupted,
and adverse use or occupation under claim of right for the entire
period prescribed by the statute of limitations."°
Like other rights acquired by prescription, the right to pollute the
river must be open and notorious for the entire statutory period. It
must be visible enough that the riparian against whom the statute
of limitations is running either knows, or should know, that his
rights have been invaded. 91 Thus, if the amount of pollution is so
small as to be inconsiderable, there will not be a "strong act of
exclusive possession" constituting notice of an adverse claim of
right,9 2 because it is concealed.
A prescriptive right can be acquired either to interfere with
riparian rights or to create a private nuisance. Although Wisconsin
has not decided this question,9" other states have recognized that an
upstream riparian can acquire a prescriptive right to pollute against
other grounds 60 N.J. Eq. 385, 45 A. 995 (1900); Hampton v. Town of Spin-
dale, 210 N.C. 546, 187 S.E. 775 (1936); Clinard v. Town of Kernersville,
215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939); Johnson v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp.,
19 Tenn. App. 648, 94 S.W.2d 54 (1935).
88. Kraver v. Smith, 164 Ky. 674, 177 S.W. 286 (1915).
89. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1346 (4th ed. 1951).
90. Barakis v. American Cyanamid Co., 161 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Tex. 1958);
Stouts Mtn. Coal & Coke Co. v. Ballard, 195 Ala. 283, 70 So. 172 (1915);
Vickers v. City of Fitzgerald, 216 Ga. 476, 117 S.E.2d 316 (1960) (dictum);
Anneberg v. Kurtz, 197 Ga. 188, 28 S.E.2d 769 (1944); Lockwood Co. v.
Lawrence, 77 Me. 297 (1885); Crosby v. Bessey, 49 Me. 539 (1860); Satren
v. Hader Co-op. Cheese Factory, 202 Minn. 553, 279 N.W. 361 (1938) (dic-
tum); Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (1939) (dic-
tum); Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899); Fansler v.
City of Sedalia, 189 Mo. App. 454, 176 S.W. 1102 (1915); City of Chillicothe
v. Bryan, 103 Mo. App. 409, 77 S.W. 465 (1903); Holsman v. Boiling Spring
Bleaching Co., 14 N.J. Eq. 335 (Ch. 1862); Prentice v. Geiger, 74 N.Y. 341
(1878), aff'g 9 Hun 350 (Sup. Ct. 1876); Williams v. Haile Gold Mining
Co., 85 S.C. 1, 66 S.E. 117 (1909).
91. Stouts Mtn. Coal & Coke Co. v. Ballard, 195 Ala. 283, 70 So. 172(1915); Pioneer Wood Pulp Co. v. Chandos, 78 Wis. 526, 47 N.W. 661 (1891).
92. See Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co. v. Kaukauna Water Power Co.,
90 Wis. 370, 401-02, 61 N.W. 1121, 1125 (1895).
93. See Behnisch v. Cedarburg Dairy Co., 180 Wis. 34, 37-38, 192 N.W.
447, 448 (1923).
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downstream riparians, either in abrogation of riparian rights94 or to
maintain a nuisance.9 5
However, no prescriptive right can be acquired to create a public
nuisance, 96 although a private individual can lose by prescription
his right to recover special damages resulting from the mainte-
nance of a public nuisance.9 7 Presumably, a private individual's
right to bring an action to abate a public nuisance under Wisconsin
Statutes section 280.02 would not be affected.
94. A right to pollute water may be obtained contrary to riparian rights
by prescription. Anneberg v. Kurtz, 197 Ga. 188, 28 S.E.2d 769 (1944);
City of Richmond v. Test, 18 Ind. App. 482, 48 N.E. 610 (1897) (dictum);
Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E. 468 (1907); Western
N.Y. Water Co. v. City of Niagara Falls, 91 Misc. 73, 154 N.Y.S. 1046 (Sup.
Ct. 1915), aff'd mem. 176 App. Div. 944, 162 N.Y.S. 1149 (1917), aff'd mem.
226 N.Y. 671, 123 N.E. 894 (1919) (dictum); McCallum v. Germantown
Water Co., 54 Pa. 40 (1867); Barakis v. American Cyanamid Co., 161 F.
Supp. 25 (N.D. Tex. 1958).
95. A right to create and maintain a private nuisance by means of water
pollution can be obtained by prescription. Stouts Mtn. Coal & Coke Co. v.
Ballard, 195 Ala. 283, 70 So. 172 (1915); Anneberg v. Kurtz, 197 Ga. 188,
28 S.E.2d 769 (1944); Watkins v. Pepperton Cotton Mills, 162 Ga. 371,
134 S.E. 69 (1926); W.G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Jones, 254 S.W.2d 720 (Ky.
1953); Fansler v. City of Sedalia, 189 Mo. App. 454, 176 S.W. 1102 (1915)
(dictum); City of Chillicothe v. Bryan, 103 Mo. App. 409, 77 S.W. 465
(1903) (dictum); Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899);
Jones v. Breyer Ice Cream Co., 1 App. Div. 2d 253, 149 N.Y.S.2d 426
(1956); Conestee Mills v. City of Greenville, 160 S.C. 10, 158 S.E. 113 (1931);
Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S.C. 1, 66 S.E. 117 (1909).
Contra, Lawton v. Herrick, 83 Conn. 417, 76 A. 986 (1910); Aubele v.
A.B. Galetovich, Inc., 83 Ohio L. Abs. 200, 165 N.E.2d 683 (Ct. App. 1960)
(dictum).
96. A waste discharger cannot acquire a right to create and maintain a
public nuisance by prescription. Birmingham v. Land, 137 Ala. 538, 34
So. 613 (1903); Smallpage v. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 538,
79 P.2d 752 (1938) (dictum); Nolan v. City of New Britain, 69 Conn. 668,
38 A. 703 (1897); Gardenhire v. Sinclair-Prairie Oil Co., 141 Kan. 865, 44
P.2d 280 (1935); W.G. Duncan Coal Co. v. Jones, 254 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1953)
(dictum); Attorney-General ex rel. Township of Wyoming v. City of Grand
Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 141 N.W. 890 (1913); Weeks-Thorn Paper Co. v.
Glenside Woolen Mills, 64 Misc. 205, 118 N.Y.S. 1027 (Sup. Ct. 1909), aff'd
mem. 140 App. Div. 878, 124 N.Y.S. 2 (1910), aff'd mem. 204 N.Y. 563,
97 N.E. 1118 (1912), reh. denied 204 N.Y. 639, 98 N.E. 1136 (1912); Fonda
v. Village of Sharon Springs, 70 Misc. 101, 128 N.Y.S. 147 (Sup. Ct. 1910);
Town of Shelby v. Cleveland Mill & Power Co., 155 N.C. 196, 71 S.E. 218
(1911); Commonwealth v. Yost, 11 Pa. Super. 323 (1899), rev'd on facts 197
Pa. 171, 46 A. 845 (1900); Commonwealth ex rel. Shumaker v. New York &
Pa. Co., 367 Pa. 40, 79 A.2d 439 (1951); City of Corsicana v. King, 3 S.W.2d
857 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Bales v. City of Tacoma, 172 Wash. 494, 20 P.2d
860 (1933); Meiners v. Frederick Miller Brewing Co., 78 Wis. 364, 47 N.W.
430 (1890); Douglass v. State, 4 Wis. 387, 392 (1855).
Contra, Haigh v. Deudraeth Rural Dist. Council, [1945] 2 All E.R.
661 (Ch.) (dictum).
97. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co. v. Telulah Paper Co., 140 Wis. 417,
122 N.W. 1062 (1909); Charnley v. Shawano Water Power & River Imp. Co.,
109 Wis. 563, 85 N.W. 507 (1901).
Contra, Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753
HeinOnline  -- 1971 Wis. L. Rev. 759 1971
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
2. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Since no Wisconsin water pollution cases deal with the statute of
limitations question, its discussion must be based on analogies to
other water law cases. Actions to recover damages for injuries sus-
tained as a result of a single occurrence of pollution must be brought
within 6 years. When damages are sought in situations of contin-
uous pollution, only those damages sustained during the 6 years
prior to commencement of the action may be recovered.
9 8
The right of action to abate a nuisance will not be barred by the
10 year statute, since the nuisance is continual. 99 If an action is
brought to enjoin pollution as a violation of riparian rights, the 20
year statute will apply. After 20 years, the polluter will have ac-
quired a prescriptive right to continue the pollution, but only if the
pollution levels were unchanging throughout the period.
Under the reasonable use concept followed in Wisconsin,10 " the
statute of limitations should begin to run when a waste discharge
becomes unreasonable with respect to uses of the water made by the
plaintiff.10 1 The date is determined by the facts and may present
problems of proof. In a nuisance action, the statute begins to run
when the nuisance first occurs. Since continuous pollution consti-
tutes a recurring or continual trespass of riparian rights or nui-
sance, a new cause of action will accrue each day until the right of
action is extinguished by prescription under the 20 year statute of
limitations. 102
In other states, the effect of the statute of limitations depends
upon whether the pollution is abatable. Where it is not, some cases
hold that the cause of action accrues when the waste discharge first
occurs. 1°0 The more popular view, however, is that the cause of ac-
tion accrues later, when the injury becomes apparent'0 4 or when it
(C.C.D. Cal. 1884); Bowen v. Wendt, 103 Cal. 236, 37 P. 149 (1894); Nolan
v. City of New Britain, 69 Conn. 668, 38 A. 703 (1897).
98. The right of action itself is not barred by the statute. Ramsdale v.
Foote, 55 Wis. 557, 13 N.W. 557 (1882).
99. Cedar Lake Hotel Co. v. Cedar Lake Hydraulic Co., 79 Wis. 297,
48 N.W. 371 (1891); Ramsdale v. Foote, 55 Wis. 557, 13 N.W. 557 (1882).
100. See discussion of the reasonable use concept as it applies to pollu-
tion, supra.
101. The question of when a cause of action accrues under the reasonable
use concept has never been decided in Wisconsin.
102. Wis. STAT. §§ 893.02, 893.08 (1969).
103. Fulmer v. Skelly Oil Co., 143 Kan. 55, 53 P.2d 825 (1936); McDaniel
v. City of Cherryvale, 91 Kan. 40, 136 P. 899 (1913); Henryetta v. Run-
yan, 370 P.2d 565 (Okla. 1962); Carter Oil Co. v. Jackson, 194 Okla. 621,
153 P.2d 1013 (1944) (dictum).
104. Hill v. Empire State-Idaho Mining & Dev. Co., 158 F. 881 (D.C.
Idaho 1908); City of Clanton v. Johnson, 245 Ala. 470, 17 So. 2d 669 (1944);
Vickers v. City of Fitzgerald, 216 Ga. 476, 117 S.E.2d 316 (1960) (dictum);
Gardenhire v. Sinclair-Prairie Oil Co., 141 Kan. 865, 44 P.2d 280 (1935);
Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., 134 Kan. 732, 8 P.2d 325 (1932); Lackey v.
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should have become known. 0 5 In such cases of permanent injury,
the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action ac-
crues, and all recovery is denied after the period of limitations has
ended.10
Cases involving temporary injuries, those in which pollution is
abatable, hold that successive causes of action are created so long as
the pollution continues. 07 The causes of action accrue when the in-
juries are or should have been discovered. 08 Because the causes of
action are successive, the statute of limitations bars recovery of
damages only for those for which the period of limitations has
ended, but recovery of damages for more recent claims is not
barred.' 09
Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 132 Kan. 754, 297 P. 679 (1931); Young v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934); Rhodes v. International
Paper Co., 174 La. 49, 139 So. 755 (1932); Spyker v. International Paper
Co., 173 La. 580, 138 So. 109 (1931); Lewis v. City of Potosi, 317 S.W.2d
623 (Mo. App. 1958), 348 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. App. 1961); Newman v. City of
El Dorado Springs, 292 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. App. 1956); Stewart v. City of
Springfield, 350 Mo. 234, 165 S.W.2d 626 (1942); Thompson v. City of
Springfield, 134 S.W.2d 1082 (Mo. App. 1939); King v. City of Rolla, 234
Mo. App. 16, 130 S.W.2d 697 (1939); Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344 Mo.
420, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (1939); Person v. City of Independence, 114 S.W.2d
175 (Mo. App. 1938); Skelly Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 195 Okla. 384, 158 P.2d
175 (1945); H.F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Johnson, 184 Okla. 198, 86 P.2d 51
(1937); H.F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 184 Okla. 196, 89 P.2d 55
(1937); Richards v. Flight, 97 Okla. 9, 222 P. 564 (1924); Barakis v.
American Cyanamid Co., 161 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Tex. 1958); Vann v.
Bowie Sewerage Co., 127 Tex. 97, 90 S.W.2d 561 (1936); McKinney v.
Emory & Henry College, 117 Va. 763, 86 S.E. 115 (1915); Virginia Hot
Springs Co. v. McCray, 106 Va. 461, 56 S.E. 216 (1907); Day v. Louisville
Coal & Coke Co., 60 W. Va. 27, 53 S.E. 776 (1906).
105. Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934);
Rhodes v. International Paper Co., 174 La. 49, 139 So. 755 (1932); Spyker v.
International Paper Co., 173 La. 580, 138 So. 109 (1931).
106. H.F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okla. 382, 101 P.2d
1050 (1940); H.F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Murphy, 186 Okla. 188, 97 P.2d
84 (1939). But one case holds that continuing damages occurring from
permanent pollution are not barred by the statute of limitations if the
period of limitations has not terminated. Pine v. Duncan, 179 Okla. 336,
65 P.2d 492 (1937).
107. Jones v. Sewer Imp. Dist., 119 Ark. 166, 177 S.W. 888 (1915); Vickers
v. City of Fitzgerald, 216 Ga. 476, 117 S.E.2d 316 (1960); West Ky. Coal
Co. v. Rudd, 328 S.W.2d 156 (Ky. 1959); Hillhouse v. City of Aurora, 316
S.W.2d 883 (Mo. App. 1958); City of Mansfield v. Hunt, 19 Ohio C.C.R. 488,
10 Ohio C. Dec. 567 (1900); City of Henryetta v. Runyan, 203 Okla. 153,
219 P.2d 220 (1950), 207 Okla. 300, 249 P.2d 425 (1952); Carter Oil Co. v.
Jackson, 194 Okla. 621, 153 P.2d 1013 (1944) (dictum); Oklahoma City v.
West, 155 Okla. 63, 7 P.2d 888 (1931); City of Magnum v. Sun Set Field,
73 Okla. 11, 174 P. 501 (1918) (dictum); Conestee Mills v. City of Green-
ville, 160 S.C. 10, 158 S.E. 113 (1931).
108. City of Bethany v. Municipal Securities Co., 274 P.2d 363 (Okla.
953); Shell Oil Co. v. Vanderslice, 192 Okla. 690, 138 P.2d 841 (1943)
(dictum).
109. Howell v. City of Dothan, 234 Ala. 158, 174 So. 624 (1937); Parsons
v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 186 Ala. 84, 64 So. 591 (1914); Tutwiler
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In cases involving a single instance of pollution, the cause of ac-
tion accrues at once,110 and all recovery is barred after the period of
limitations has run. Where there have been incremental increases
in pollution, the situation is treated as successive pollution, and
damages may be recovered for that increment which has not con-
tinued for the entire period of limitations."' Recovery for injuries
caused by increased pollution is not barred merely because the stat-
ute of limitations bars recovery for the earlier levels of pollution.12
3. COMPARATIVE CONVENIENCE
Even under a reasonable flow test, riparian rights litigation
would seriously curtail the activities of industries and municipal
waste treatment plants, whenever it could be shown that degrada-
tion of water was great enough to interfere substantially with use of
the watercourse by downstream riparians. Because the economic
impact on municipalities and major industries of an injunction or-
dering pollution abatement may be highly out of proportion to the
social cost of the pollution on downstream riparians, courts have
created the comparative convenience doctrine. The doctrine allows
economic factors to be included in a determination of what consti-
tutes reasonable use. Thus, in pollution cases, the courts balance
the social and economic utility of the activities carried on by both
parties, the cost of abating the pollution, and the nature and gravity
of the harm suffered by plaintiff. Numerous courts have called the
process comparative convenience or balancing the equities.1 3 Oth-
ers, including Wisconsin, have rejected the terms. 1 4 But, with rare
exception, most pollution cases involve a balancing process, what-
ever name is given it.
Frequently, courts state they are using the balancing test when
they believe the defendant's polluting activity should be allowed,
Coal, Coke & Iron Co. v. Nichols, 146 Ala. 364, 39 So. 762 (1905); Bennett
v. City of Marion, 119 Iowa 473, 93 N.W. 558 (1903); Young v. International
Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934); Rhodes v. International Paper
Co., 174 La. 49, 139 So. 755 (1932); Spyker v. International Paper Co.,
173 La. 580, 138 So. 109 (1931); Driscoll v. American Hide & Leather Co.,
102 Misc. 612, 170 N.Y.S. 121 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd mem. 184 App. Div. 916,
170 N.Y.S. 1076 (1918); Fonda v. Village of Sharon Springs, 70 Misc. 101,
128 N.Y.S. 147 (Sup. Ct. 1910); H.F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 184
Okla. 196, 89 P.2d 55 (1937); Conestee Mills v. City of Greenville, 160 S.C.
10, 158 S.E. 113 (1931); Harrington (Earl) v. Derby Corp. [1905] 1 Ch.
205 (1904).
110. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Nabers, 134 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
111. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Morgan, 181 Ala. 587, 61 So. 283
(1913); Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899); Commer-
cial Drilling Co. v. Kennedy, 172 Okla. 475, 45 P.2d 534 (1935).
112. Riggs v. City of Springfield, 344 Mo. 420, 126 S.W.2d 1144 (1939);
H.F. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Murphy, 186 Okla. 188, 97 P.2d 84 (1939); H.F.
Wilcox Oil & Gas Co. v. Juedeman, 187 Okla. 382, 101 P.2d 1050 (1940).
113. See cases listed in Appendices E(1) and E(3), infra.
114. See cases listed in Appendices E(2) and E(4), infra.
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but reject the doctrine when they believe his conduct should not
continue. In both situations, of course, the courts are actually using
the comparative convenience doctrine. Thus, on the facts, injunc-
tions have been refused in the following situations: where the com-
plainant's investment was small compared with the polluter's, but
where significant damage was suffered by the complainant, 115
where the injury to the complainant was inconsequential," 6 or
where the invasion of his right was merely technical.17 In a great
many cases, injunctive relief was denied where the court believed
money damages would provide adequate relief.1 1 However, injunc-
115. Comparative convenience was accepted and relief was denied in a
few cases where the defendant's investment was much greater than the
plaintiffs but where the plaintiff suffered significant damage. Barnard v.
Sherley, 135 Ind. 547, 34 N.E. 600, 35 N.E. 117 (1893) (artesian bathing
water from an asylum for syphilis patients polluted a farm livestock water
supply); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886)
(acid mine drainage corroded an ornamental garden fountain, polluted a
domestic water supply, and killed fish in an ornamental pond); Hogue v.
City of Bowie, 209 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (a defective city sew-
age plant caused odors and made water unfit to drink by cattle).
116. Comparative convenience language has been accepted and relief
denied where the defendant's investment was much greater than the
plaintiffs and where the latter's injuries were inconsequential. Clifton
Iron Co. v. Dye, 87 Ala. 468, 6 So. 192 (1888) (iron ore washings created a
sediment deposit in a stream but did not affect a hog water supply);
Clark v. Lindsay Light & Chem. Co., 341 Ill. App. 316, 93 N.E.2d 441 (1950)
(chemical refuse made a stream, usually dry but for the added waste dis-
charge, unfit to drink by cattle); Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La.
803, 155 So. 231 (1934) (paper mill wastes killed cypress trees in a
swamp); Wood v. Sutcliffe, 2 Sim. (n.s.) 163, 61 Eng. Rep. 303 (V.C. 1851)
(dye wastes affected water used by a wool washing factory).
117. Comparative convenience language was accepted and relief denied
where the defendant's investment was greater than the plaintiff's and where
the invasion of the plaintiff's rights was merely technical. Michelsen v.
Leskowicz, 55 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1945), affd mem. 270 App. Div. 1042,
63 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1946) (duck farm debris reduced the value of unused
marshland which was not suitable for residential purposes); Lillywhite v.
Trimmer, 36 L.J. Ch. 525, 16 L.T.R. (n.s.) 318 (V.C. 1867) (city sewage
killed fish, made water unfit to drink and filled a millpond with scum).
118. Comparative convenience language has been accepted in several
cases where damages were considered adequate relief in view of the eco-
nomic effect which would be caused if an injunction were granted. Drake
v. Lady Ensley Coal, Iron & Ry. Co., 102 Ala. 501, 14 So. 749 (1893) (mine
tailings and clay made water unfit to drink by cattle and deposited sedi-
ment on a farm); Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46 (1913) (dic-
tum) (copper ore tailings poisoned irrigated farmland); Wright v. Best,
19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P.2d 702 (1942) (mine tailings fouled an irrigation
water supply); City of Lakeland v. State ex rel. Harris, 143 Fla. 761, 197
So. 470 (1940) (sewage plant effluent polluted a stream); McCarthy v.
Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 164 F. 927 (9th Cir.
1908) (mine tailings polluted a livestock water supply and killed vegeta-
tion); Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934)
(paper mill wastes killed cypress trees in a swamp); Busby v. International
Paper Co., 95 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. La. 1951) (paper mill wastes overflowing
from a stream made a small piece of land uncultivatable); Edwards v.
Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46 (1878) (land speculator's land covered
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tive relief was granted where the acts complained of could have
been remedied at little expense, 19 where both parties had substan-
tial investments and the damage to the complainant was great 20 or
the acts of the polluters were unreasonable,' 2 1 where a public water
by sand from a stamping mill); Monroe Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin
Paper Co., 240 Mich. 279, 215 N.W. 325 (1927) (paper mill wastes killed fish
in a commercial fish hatchery); Smith v. City of Sedalia, 244 Mo. 107,
149 S.W. 597 (1912) (city sewer polluted a stream at a farm); City of
Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933), rev'g 61
F.2d 210 (8th Cir. 1932) (inadequately treated sewage damaged a pas-
ture); Grey ex rel. Simmons v. City of Paterson, 60 N.J. Eq. 385, 45 A. 995
(1900), rev'g 58 N.J. Eq. 1, 42 A. 749 (Ch. 1899) (raw sewage created a
public and private nuisance); Salem Iron Co. v. Hyland, 74 Ohio St. 160,
77 N.E. 751 (1906) (oil well brine made water unfit for boilers); Straight
v. Hover, 79 Ohio St. 263, 87 N.E. 174 (1909) (oil well brine made water
unfit to drink by cattle); Elder v. Lykens Valley Coal Co., 157 Pa. 490,
27 A. 545 (1893) (dictum) (mine tailings covered a farm during an extra-
ordinary flood); Parsons v. City of Sioux Falls, 65 S.D. 145, 272 N.W. 288
(1937) (untreated city sewage killed vegetation, and made water unfit to
drink by cattle; the water's vapors discolored paint and caused odors);
Thomas v. Village of Clear Lake, 270 Wis. 630, 72 N.W.2d 541 (1955)
(treated sewage discharged into a dry run affected a pasture); Sussex
Land & Livestock Co. v. Midwest Ref. Co., 294 F. 597 (8th Cir. 1923) (un-
avoidable oil leaks poisoned a creek used for natural irrigation and for
livestock watering).
119. Comparative convenience language was rejected and injunctive re-
lief was granted where the expense of abating the pollution would be rela-
tively slight. Meriwether Sand & Gravel Co. v. State ex rel. Attorney
General, 181 Ark. 216, 26 S.W.2d 57 (1930) (gravel washings were deposited
on a farm, and killed fish in a stream; comparative convenience was ac-
cepted but relief was granted on the facts because the act constituted a
public and private nuisance); Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass.
591, 81 N.E. 468 (1907) (wool washing wastes affected a paper mill water
supply).
120. Comparative convenience language was rejected and injunctive re-
lief was granted in cases where both parties had made a substantial in-
vestment and where the plaintiff's damages were great. Morgan v. City
of Danbury, 67 Conn. 484, 35 A. 499 (1896) (raw sewage made water unfit
to drink by cattle and to wash cider barrels and clothes at commercial
establishments); Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E.
468 (1907) (wool wastes so polluted a stream that a paper mill was forced
to close down); Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co., 54 N.J. Eq. 65, 33 A. 286
(Ch. 1895), aff'd sub nom. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co. v. Sparks Mfg. Co.,
55 N.J. Eq. 824, 38 A. 426 (1897) (ore tailings discolored a paper mill
water supply); Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo,
246 App. Div. 472, 284 N.Y.S. 598 (1936), modified 273 N.Y. 119, 7 N.E.2d
10 (1937) (untreated city sewage polluted and destroyed a sand and gravel
deposit); Pennington v. Brinsop Hall Coal Co., 5 Ch. D. 769 (1877) (acid
mine drainage corroded boilers); John Young & Co. v. Bankier Distillery
Co., [1893] A.C. 691 (Scot.) (acid mine drainage altered the chemical
characteristics of water used to distill whiskey).
121. Comparative convenience language was rejected and injunctive re-
lief was granted in cases where the defendant's acts were considered to be
unreasonable. Platt Bros. & Co. v. City of Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531, 45 A.
154 (1900) (city sewage made water unfit as industrial process water);
Attorney General ex rel. Township of Wyoming v. City of Grand Rapids,
175 Mich. 503, 141 N.W. 890 (1913) (untreated city sewage created odors
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supply was affected, 122 where a public nuisance'1 2 3 or private nui-
sance was created by municipal or industrial polluters 2 4 or where
in a downstream village); Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co. v. City of
Buffalo, 246 App. Div. 472, 284 N.Y.S. 598 (1936), modified 273 N.Y. 119,
7 N.E.2d 10 (1937) (untreated city sewage polluted and destroyed a sand
and gravel deposit); Kennedy v. Moog, Servocontrols, Inc., 48 Misc. 2d
107, 264 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1965), modified 26 App. Div. 2d 768, 271
N.Y.S.2d 928 (1966), aff'd 21 N.Y.2d 966, 237 N.E.2d 356 (1968) (treated
domestic sewage from an industrial plant made water unfit to drink by
cattle and filled a ditch).
122. Comparative convenience language was rejected and injunctive
relief was granted where pollution affected a public water supply. In-
dianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard Co., 53 F. 970, 57 F. 1000
(C.C.D. Ind. 1893) (paper mill wastes); Commonwealth ex rel. McCor-
mick v. Russell, 172 Pa. 506, 33 A. 709 (1896) (by implication) (oil well
brine); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386
(1924) (acid mine drainage); Stockport Waterworks Co. v. Potter, 7 H. & N.
160, 158 Eng. Rep. 433 (Ex. 1861) (calico dye wastes, including arsenic).
123. Comparative convenience language was rejected and injunctive re-
lief was granted in cases where pollution created public nuisances. Wood-
ruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884)
(hydraulic mine tailings filled a stream channel and made water cloudy);
Attorney General ex rel. Town of Wyoming v. City of Grand Rapids, 175
Mich. 503, 141 N.W. 890 (1913) (untreated city sewage created odors in a
downstream village); Commonwealth ex rel. McCormick v. Russell, 172
Pa. 506, 33 A. 709 (1896) (by implication) (oil well brine made water in a
city reservoir unpotable); Attorney General v. Colney Hatch Lunatic Asy-
lum, L.R. 4 Ch. 145 (1868) (raw sewage polluted a stream); Attorney-
General v. Hackney Local Bd., L.R. 20 Eq. 626 (V.C. 1875) (raw sewage
polluted a stream and caused odors).
Comparative convenience language was accepted in one such case, but
was held to be inapplicable on the facts. Meriwether Sand & Gravel Co.
v. State ex rel. Attorney General, 181 Ark. 216, 26 S.W.2d 57 (1930)
(gravel washings killed fish and were deposited on a farm).
Contra: comparative convenience language was accepted to deny in-
junctive relief in public nuisance cases. City of Lakeland v. State ex rel.
Harris, 143 Fla. 761, 197 So. 470 (1940) (discussed with respect to injunc-
tions); Grey ex tel. Simmons v. City of Paterson, 60 N.J. Eq. 385, 45 A. 995
(1900), rev'g 58 N.J. Eq. 1, 42 A. 749 (Ch. 1899) (damages awarded);
Attorney General v. Dorking Union, 20 Ch. D. 595 (C.A. 1882).
124. Comparative convenience language was rejected and injunctive re-
lief was granted in cases where industries created private nuisances. Hill
v. Standard Mining Co., 12 Idaho 223, 85 P. 907 (1906) (mine tailings filled
a streambed, were deposited on a ranch, and poisoned a nearby well);
Weston Paper Co. v. Pope, 155 Ind. 394, 57 N.E. 719 (1900) (paper mill
wastes polluted a stream); Bowman v. Humphrey, 132 Iowa 234, 109 N.W.
714 (1906) (creamery wastes caused odors on a farm); Satren v. Hader
Co-op Cheese Factory, 202 Minn. 553, 279 N.W. 361 (1938) (whey polluted
a stream and caused odors to pervade a farmhouse); Strobel v. Kerr Salt
Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900) (salt mine drainage corroded mill
machinery, killed fish and made water undrinkable by cattle); Whalen v.
Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913) (paper mill wastes
damaged a farm); Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 85 S.C. 1, 66 S.E.
117 (1909) (gold mine treated washings created acid and completely de-
stroyed the productive capacity of a farm); H.B. Bowling Coal Co. v.
Ruffner, 117 Tenn. 180, 100 S.W. 116 (1906) (acid mill wastes corroded a
boiler and made water unfit for domestic or livestock use); Shoffner v.
Sutherland, 111 Va. 298, 68 S.E. 996 (1910) (sawdust made a stream unfit
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the polluted water entered the stream from a nonriparian source. 1 25
Reasons stated for adopting the comparative convenience doctrine
include preference for industrial development as a matter of public
interest, 1 26 and classification of mining as a natural use of land like
farming.1 2 7  By contrast, the doctrine has been rejected because
industry was considered an artifical use of land, 1 28 or because
pumping out mine drainage was likewise considered an artificial use
of land. 29 Five cases denied relief because enjoining the pollution
would have created a great financial burden on the public,13 0 and
for domestic purposes arid caused odors); Day v. Louisville Coal & Coke
Co., 60 W. Va. 27, 53 S.E. 776 (1906) (cinders, slag and mine tailings were
deposited on a farm and rendered a stream unfit for domestic or agricul-
tural purposes); Middlestadt v. Waupaca Starch & Potato Co., 93 Wis. 1,
66 N.W. 713 (1896) (starch refuse made water unusable for domestic pur-
poses); Tiede v. Schneidt, 105 Wis. 470, 81 N.W. 826 (1900) (rendering
plant effluent made water unfit for domestic or livestock purposes and
caused odors).
In one case, comparative convenience was accepted, but relief was
granted on the facts. Meriwether Sand & Gravel Co. v. State ex rel.
Attorney General, 181 Ark. 216, 26 S.W.2d 57 (1930) (gravel washings
killed fish and were deposited on a farm).
Contra: comparative convenience language was accepted and injunc-
tive relief was denied in cases where industries created private nuisances.
Sussex Land & Livestock Co. v. Midwest Ref. Co., 294 F. 597 (8th Cir.
1923) (damages awarded) (unavoidable oil leaks polluted a stream used
for natural irrigation and watering cattle); Straight v. Hover, 79 Ohio St.
263, 87 N.E. 174 (1909) (damages awarded) (oil well brine made water
unfit to drink by cattle); Salem Iron Co. v. Hyland, 74 Ohio St. 160, 77
N.E. 751 (1906) (damages awarded) (oil well brine made water unsuitable
for boilers); Windfohr v. Johnson's Estate, 57 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932) (oil well brine killed pecan trees).
125. Getting v. Union Imp. Co., 7 Luz. L. Reg. R. 493 (Pa. County Ct.
1895); Williams v. Union Imp. Co., 1 Pa. Dist. 288, 6 Luz. L. Reg. R. 417
(Pa. County Ct. 1892).
126. McCarthy v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co.,
164 F. 927 (9th Cir. 1908); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa.
126, 6 A. 453 (1886).
127. Weston Paper Co. v. Pope, 155 Ind. 394, 57 N.E. 719 (1900) (dictum);
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886) (lim-
ited by the Hindson and McCune cases, notes 128-29, infra, to gravity
mine drainage).
128. Weston Paper Co. v. Pope, 155 Ind. 394, 57 N.E. 719 (1900); Latonia
Ref. Corp. v. Dusing, 246 Ky. 328, 55 S.W.2d 23 (1932); Mississippi Mills
Co. v. Smith, 69 Miss. 299, 11 So. 26 (1892); Townsend v. Bell, 62 Hun. 306,
17 N.Y.S. 210 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Hindson v. Markle, 171 Pa. 138, 33 A. 74
(1895).
129. Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co., 54 N.J. Eq. 65, 33 A. 286 (Ch.
1895); aff'd sub nom. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co. v. Sparks Mfg. Co., 55
N.J. Eq. 824, 38 A. 426 (1897); McCune v. Pittsburgh & Baltimore Coal Co.,
238 Pa. 83, 85 A. 1102 (1913); H.B. Bowling Coal Co. v. Ruffner, 117 Tenn.
180, 100 S.W. 116 (1906).
130. Relief has been denied in cases involving municipal defendants be-
cause abatement would place too great a financial burden on the public.
Morgan v. City of Danbury, 67 Conn. 484, 35 A. 499 (1896); City of Valpa-
raiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337, 54 N.E. 1062 (1899); City of Harrisonville v.
W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933), rev'g 61 F.2d 210 (8th Cir.
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three cases have rejected that argument.' 3 ' The courts consider the
value of the polluter's activity to society and to the local economy,
both in determining whether the activity constitutes a reasonable
use of the water, and, if it does not, whether it should be enjoined or
whether money damages would suffice as a remedy. Language con-
cerning natural purity and use of one's land without injuring the
use of another's land is found only in those cases where the pollu-
tion is so gross as to constitute a public or private nuisance.
If the acceptance or rejection of "comparative convenience" as a
doctrine were the basis of decision in these cases, one would expect
to find more than a handful of the cases turning on that ground
alone. But, only two cases rejected "comparative convenience" out
of hand and gave injunctive relief to small complainants who had
suffered minor injuries as a result of the activities of major indus-
tries; both of these cases involve private nuisances. 18 2 In other cases
where injunctive relief was granted, there was good reason to grant
relief even if the "comparative convenience" doctrine had been
adopted. 133
All Wisconsin pollution cases involve public or private nuisance
situations. None were decided on the reasonable use concept of the
riparian doctrine. As elsewhere in the United States, those cases
involving nuisance situations rejected the "comparative conven-
ience" doctrine. 134 And like cases in other jurisdictions, injunctive
1932); Sammons v. City of Gloversville, 34 Misc. 459, 70 N.Y.S. 284 (Sup.
Ct. 1901), aff'd mem. 67 App. Div. 628, 74 N.Y.S. 1145 (1901), aff'd 175
N.Y. 346, 67 N.E. 622 (1903); Warren v. City of Gloversville, 81 App. Div.
291, 80 N.Y.S. 912 (1903).
131. The argument that relief should be denied because abatement of
pollution would place too great a burden on the public has been rejected in
a few cases involving municipal defendants. State ex rel. Harris v. City of
Lakeland, 141 Fla. 795, 193 So. 826 (1940); North Dade Water Co. v. Adken
Land Co., 130 So. 2d 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
132. Comparative convenience language was rejected and injunctive
relief was granted in certain cases even though the plaintiff's damages
were small. Hunter v. Taylor Coal Co., 16 Ky. L.R. 190 (1894) (acid mine
wastes poisoned a farm water supply and killed vegetation when the creek
overflowed); Satren v. Hader Co-op Cheese Factory, 202 Minn. 553, 279
N.W. 361 (1938) (whey polluted water and caused odors to pervade a
farmhouse; annual damages were $63); Townsend v. Bell, 62 Hun. 306,
17 N.Y.S. 210 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (dye wastes discolored a stream flowing past
unused land); Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805
(1913) (paper mill wastes affected a farm; annual damages were $100);
Kennedy v. Moog, Servocontrols, Inc., 48 Misc. 2d 107, 264 N.Y.S.2d 606
(Sup. Ct. 1965), modified 26 App. Div. 2nd 768, 271 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1966),
aff'd 21 N.Y.2d 966, 237 N.E.2d 356, 290 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1968) (treated do-
mestic sewage made water unfit to drink by cattle and filled a ditch);
McCune v. Pittsburgh & Baltimore Coal Co., 238 Pa. 83, 85 A. 1102 (1913)
(acid mine drainage pumped from a mine polluted a farm water supply);
Spokes v. Banbury Bd. of Health, L.R. 1 Eq. 42 (V.C. 1865) (city sewage
killed fish and made water unfit to drink).
133. See notes 119-125, supra and accompanying text.
134. Briggson v. City of Viroqua, 264 Wis. 47, 52-54, 58 N.W.2d 546, 549
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relief was granted, 1"6 except in one situation, when a municipal pol-
luter had done all it could reasonably be expected to do to abate pol-
lution according to the current state of the art. 3 6 Only one case
suggests the Wisconsin court would refuse to grant an injunction
against a municipal polluter if it would cause a disproportionate
hardship, and in that case an injunction had already been issued.13 7
4. JURISDICTION OF REGULATORY AGENCIES
The existence of an agency regulating water pollution makes pos-
sible four defenses to a common law pollution abatement action.
They are: (a) exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative agency,
precluding a court from hearing a common law action, (b) compli-
ance with an administrative pollution abatement order, (c) failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, and (d) primary jurisdiction,
both of which postpone a common law action until the administra-
tive process has been concluded.
Carmichael, in his article on the former Wisconsin State Commit-
tee on Water Pollution, has described the dimensions of the problem.
[P]rivate parties [have a right] to bring actions against
polluters for damages and injunctions to compel the abate-
ment of private nuisances. Suit may evidently be brought
not only during the process of administrative regulation of
the polluter, but also after such regulation has resulted in
order compliance, for it is settled doctrine that legislative
authorization to operate a sewerage system or sewerage
treatment plant does not imply authorization to create a
private nuisance and does not foreclose judicial determina-
tion of the existence of a private nuisance and the awarding
of appropriate relief. 13 8 This doctrine might be extended to
provide that such legislative authorization does not autho-
(1953); Hasslinger v. Village of Hartland, 234 Wis. 201, 208, 290 N.W. 647,
650 (1940); Mitchell Realty Co. v. West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 362, 199 N.W.
390, 393 (1924); Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 107-09, 85
N.W. 668, 670 (1901); Tiede v. Schneidt, 105 Wis. 470, 479-80, 81 N.W. 826,
829 (1900); Middlestadt v. Waupaca Starch & Potato Co., 93 Wis. 1, 4,
66 N.W. 713, 714 (1896).
135. All cases cited in note 134, supra, except Hasslinger, where only
money damages were requested.
136. Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 419, 129 N.W.2d
217, 222 (1964) (dictum).
137. Thomas v. Village of Clear Lake, 270 Wis. 630, 635-36, 72 N.W.2d 541,
543-44 (1955). In that case, the issue was whether permanent damages
could be awarded in addition to a permanent injunction. The court held
they could be awarded in that situation. See Hasslinger v. Village of Hart-
land, 234 Wis. 201, 212, 290 N.W. 647, 652 (1940) (dictum), a case in which
only damages were sought in a situation where a private nuisance could
not be abated by any means known within the state of the art.
138. Citing Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 415-16, 129
N.W.2d 217, 220-21 (1964); Briggson v. City of Viroqua, 264 Wis. 47, 58
N.W.2d 546 (1953); Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1177, 1182 (1955). See Hasslinger
v. Village of Hartland, 234 Wis. 201, 207-08, 290 N.W. 647, 649-50 (1940).
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rize the usurpation of the rights of fellow riparians and that
the courts could declare and protect such rights18 9 despite a
polluter's compliance with an order. 40 Thus, private par-
ties might interject themselves and their claims into the
midst of the administrative regulatory process by means of
private litigation or they might attack the pollution abate-
ment results of the regulatory process after its conclusion,
in either case with disruptive results. A lower riparian
might successfully assert that he had not been heard con-
cerning the department's approval of a treatment plant
and that his rights were invaded despite such approval.
The polluter might then be required by the court to make
costly plant alterations or additions beyond those ordered
and approved by the department.' 41
Since riparian rights law, as well as private nuisance law,142 govern
the respective rights of waste dischargers and other riparian water
users, Carmichael's discussion clearly applies to both, compounding
the possibility that the regulatory process could be subject to dis-
ruption by private lawsuits.
a. Exclusive jurisdiction of state pollution control agency
The Wisconsin Supreme Court long ago held that private nuisance
suits would not be precluded merely because the nuisance resulted
from the performance of a governmental function by a municipality
unless specific legislation so provided. 43 In a later case, the court
rejected the contention that assumption of jurisdiction over a mu-
nicipal sewage disposal plant by the State Board of Health ousted
the courts of all jurisdiction over resulting private nuisances. 44
139. Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 107-08, 85 N.W. 668,
670 (1901), supports this view.
140. Citing Annot., 46 A.L.R. 8, 54-56 (1927).
141. Carmichael, Forty Years of Water Pollution Control in Wisconsin:
A Case Study, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 350, 379-83. Since the Wisconsin statutes
do not provide for meaningful nonpolluter participation in the regulatory
process, id. at 378-79, Carmichael suggests that the process be revised to
include such participation and to foreclose private actions other than ju-
dicial review of a pollution abatement order at the conclusion of the regula-
tory process. Id. at 380-83.
142. See notes 28-48 supra, and accompanying text.
143. Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 107-08, 85 N.W. 668,
670 (1901); Mitchell Realty Co. v. City of West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 362,
199 N.W. 390, 393-94 (1924).
144. 234 Wis. 201, 207-08, 290 N.W. 647, 649-50 (1940). The court said:
[I]t is claimed that a sewage disposal plant which follows approved
specifications cannot be held a nuisance. This contention is inapplic-
able to the present situation. It may be that if the claim of the ad-joining landowner is that the manner of operation is such as to con-
stitute a nuisance, the fact that the plant was built according to spec-
ifications of the state board of health and is being operated in ac-
cordance with their orders and regulations may conclusively estab-
lish that there is no nuisance arising out of design or operation of the
plant. Where, however, the claim is that the plant is a nuisance, not
by reason of improper operation or planning, but because of its lo-
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And dictum in that case, to the effect that Board of Health approval
of design or operation of a plant may preclude nuisance actions,1 45
was specifically rejected in a recent case, Costas v. City of Fond du
Lac.146
Private nuisance actions, and presumably riparian rights actions,
may be brought in Wisconsin to abate pollution even when the state
has asserted regulatory jurisdiction. Only if the legislature specifi-
cally bars such actions by appropriate legislation will that right be
foreclosed. No such legislation exists. 147
cation, the owner is not concluded by the orders or approval of the
state board of health...
... [T]he board of health did not require the village to build
the sewage disposal plant or to build it in its present location. All
it did was to approve the plans and specifications for the plant.
While plans included the location of the . . . plant, and the latter
may have been within the scope of the board's approval, it was not
within the competency of the board to foreclose a judicial determina-
tion whether by reason of location the plant would be a nuisance
per se.
145. Hasslinger v. Village of Hartland, 234 Wis. 201, 207-08, 290 N.W.
647, 649-50 (1940).
146. Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 415-16, 129 N.W.2d
217, 220-21 (1964).147. Prior to 1966 there was a section in the statutes (§ 144.535) which
might have been construed as creating exclusive jurisdiction in the State
Committee on Water Pollution or the State Board of Health if it assumedjurisdiction of a case. However, this language was repealed by ch. 614,
§ 47, [1965] Wis. Laws 1109, and the question of the effect of that section
is now moot.
Very few states have held that the existence of a state pollution regu-
latory agency precludes jurisdiction of a court to hear a private pollution
abatement action. Most states have adopted the contrary rule, that the
existence of state regulation does not imply abrogation of common law
rights and remedies, that they are preserved and that the administrative
remedies are cumulative. Many states have done this by statute. ARIz.
REV. STAT. § 36-1866 (Supp. 1969); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1943 (Supp.
1967); CALIF. WATER CODE ANN., § 13001 (West Supp. 1968); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 66-28-17 (Supp. 1966-67); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.191 (Supp. 1969);
GA. CODE ANN., tit. 17, § 517 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 204.160 (Ver-
non 1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-39-12 (1968); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW
§ 1260 (McKinney Supp. 1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6111.08 (Page
0000); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 82, § 913 (Supp. 1968); PA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 35, § 691.701 (Purdon 1964); S.C. CODE § 70-137 (1962); TEX. STAT.
ANN., art. 762ld-1, § 20 (Vernon Supp. 1968); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-14-13
(1968); Ch. 13, § 25, [1967] Wash. Laws 54.
Several states have not adopted preservation of rights statutes but
have nonetheless held that common law rights are preserved. Ruth v.
Aurora Sanitary Dist., 17 Ill. 2d 11, 158 N.E.2d 601 (1959); Dunlop Lake
Property Owners Ass'n v. City of Edwardsville, 22 Ill. App. 2d 95, 159
N.E.2d 4 (1959); Reeder v. Rooks County, 193 Kan. 182, 392 P.2d 888 (1964);
Texas Co. v. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. La. 1947); Stanton v. St.
Joseph's College, 233 A.2d 718 (Me. 1967); Satren v. Hader Co-op.
Cheese Factory, 202 Minn. 553, 279 N.W. 361 (1938); Massey v. Masonite
Corp., 219 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1955); Urie v. Franconia Paper Corp., 107 N.H.
131, 218 A.2d 360 (1966); Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders,
Inc., 40 N.J. Super. 62, 122 A.2d 233 (1956). See also Wallace v. M'Cartan,
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B. Compliance with agency orders
The cases mentioned above also dispose of the defense of compli-
ance with the orders of a state agency. 148
C. Exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdic-
tion
No Wisconsin case has considered whether a pollution abatement
action should be heard by the administrative agency before the
court. Language in the Wisconsin cases indicates that a private ac-
tion may be brought at any time, but that language is not conclu-
sive since in none of the matters in those cases was the controversy
before the agency at the time the lawsuit was begun. Furthermore,
all cases after 1949 were brought subsequent to the agency's pro-
ceedings.
The United States Supreme Court has explained the purposes of
and differences between exhaustion and primary jurisdiction:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, like the rule requir-
ing exhaustion of administrative remedies, is concerned
with promoting proper relationships between the courts
and administrative agencies charged with particular regula-
tory duties. 'Exhaustion' applies where a claim is cogniza-
ble in the first instance by an administrative agency alone;
judicial interference is withheld until the administrative
process has run its course. 'Primary jurisdiction', on the'
other hand, applies where a claim is originally cognizable
in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of
the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such a case the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues
to the administrative body for its views. 1 49
Apparently, both doctrines have been accepted in Wisconsin, al-
[1917] 1 Ir. R. 377 (Ch.); Bright v. Niagara Racing Ass'n., 20 Ont. W.N. 46
(1921).
148. One state has enacted a provision specifically rejecting as a de-
fense compliance with a state pollution abatement order. VA. CODE § 62.1-
36 (1968). The courts in a few states have adopted the same rule. Bar-
rington Hills Country Club v. Village of Barrington, 357 Ill. 11, 191 N.E. 239
(1934); People v. City of Reedley, 66 Cal. App. 409, 226 P. 408 (1924);
Stanton v. St. Joseph's College, 233 A.2d 718 (Me. 1967); Southland Co. v.
McDonald, 225 Miss. 19, 82 So. 2d 448 (1955); Donnell v. City of Greensboro,
164 N.C. 330, 80 S.E. 377 (1913); Cook v. Town of Mebane, 191 N.C. 1,
131 S.E. 407 (1926).
Furthermore, state approval of plans is not a defense. Borough of
Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, Inc., 40 N.J. Super., 62, 122 A.2d 233
(1956); Kennedy v. Moog, Servocontrol, Inc., 48 Misc. 2d 107, 264 N.Y.S.2d
606 (Sup. Ct. 1965), modified 26 App. Div. 2d 768, 271 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1966),
aff'd mem., 21 N.Y.2d 966, 237 N.E.2d 356, 290 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1968).
149. United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956).
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though the extent of their application is by no means clear. These
rules, as they have been discussed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
do not involve loss of subject matter jurisdiction by the courts. 50
Rather they involve deferral by the courts because, at the particular
stage of the proceedings, a more proper forum for hearing the con-
troversy is the administrative agency with special competence in
the field.151
The question of exhaustion of administrative remedies arises ei-
ther when a court action is brought in the midst of an administra-
tive proceeding before an agency with special competence in the
field or before such proceedings have been initiated where the
agency has been given jurisdiction over the matter in contro-
versy. 15 2 The question of primary jurisdiction arises when a court
action is initiated over a matter in which an administrative agency
150. Wisconsin Collectors Ass'n v. Thorp Fin. Corp., 32 Wis. 2d 36, 44,
145 N.W.2d 33, 36-38 (1966). On the question of primary jurisdiction,
Wisconsin Collectors Association is the only case in point. Cf. Common-
wealth Tel. Co. v. Carley, 192 Wis. 464, 213 N.W. 469 (1927). On the ques-
tion of exhaustion of administrative remedies, several earlier cases dis-
cussed the rule, but none of them held that failure to exhaust administra-
tive remedies resulted in the court's loss of subject matter jurisdiction.
Green v. Jones, 23 Wis. 2d 551, 128 N.W.2d 1 (1964); Village of Cobb v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 12 Wis. 2d 441, 107 N.W.2d 595 (1961); James Conroy
Family Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 246 Wis. 258, 16 N.W.2d 814 (1944).
151. In the only case discussing the "primary jurisdiction" and "exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies" rules at length, the court said:
We fully recognize that administrative agencies are designed to
provide uniformity and consistency in the fields of their specialized
knowledge. The expertise that comes with experience and also the
fact-finding facility that comes with a more flexible procedure enable
the agencies to perform a valuable public function. When an issue
arises which fits squarely within the very area for which the agency
was created, it would be logical to require prior administrative re-
course before a court entertains jurisdiction...
Nonetheless, we believe it improper to couch such priority in
terms of power or jurisdiction. The standard in our opinion, should
not be power but comity. The court must consider which course
would best serve the ends of justice. If the issue presented to the
court involves exclusively factual issues within the peculiar expertise
of the [agency], the obviously better course would be to decline
jurisdiction and to refer the matter to the agency. On the other hand,
if statutory interpretation or issues of law are significant, the court
may properly choose in its discretion to entertain the proceedings.
The trial court should exercise its discretion with an understanding
that the legislature has created the agency in order to afford a syste-
matic method of fact-finding and policymaking and that the agency'sjurisdiction should be given priority in the absence of a valid reason
for judicial intervention.
Wisconsin Collectors Ass'n v. Thorp Fin. Co., 32 Wis. 2d 36, 44-45, 145
N.W.2d 33, 36-37 (1966).
152. The "exhaustion of administrative remedies" rule has been followed
in three private water pollution abatement actions in two other states.
Commerce Oil Ref. Co. v. Miner, 170 F. Supp. 396 (D.R.I. 1959), rev'd on
other grounds, 281 F.2d 465 (lst Cir. 1960), cert. denied 364 U.S. 910 (1960);
Commonwealth v. Glen Alden Corp., 418 Pa. 57, 210 A.2d 256 (1965);
Borough of Collegeville v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 377 Pa. 636,
105 A.2d 722 (1954).
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has special competence but not necessarily particular jurisdiction.
In determining whether it will exercise its own jurisdiction, the
court must decide both whether the matter falls within the agency's
special fact-finding competence, and whether the agency has juris-
diction to hear the matter. 15 '
Thus, an early question in fashioning water pollution litigation
is whether the Wisconsin water pollution control agency has juris-
diction.' The Department of Natural Resources does not have spe-
cific statutory jurisdiction to hear such cases, although it deals with
such matters as part of its general jurisdiction over the quality of
the waters of the state. The water quality control jurisdiction of the
Department may be invoked in two ways. On the basis of its own
investigations,' 55 or as a result of informal complaints lodged with
it, the Department may on its own initiative begin proceedings'1 6
to abate pollution by means of setting water quality standards, 1 7
and issuing general orders, 15 8 special orders, 5 9 or temporary emer-
gency orders.160 Since jurisdiction is discretionary,16 1 the Depart-
153. Davis is of the opinion that the "primary jurisdiction" rule should
be followed even if the administrative agency does not have power to
grant relief.
Because of the purpose of the doctrine-to assure that the agency
will not be by-passed on what is especially committed to it-and
because resort to the courts is still open after the agency has acted,
the doctrine applies even if the agency has no jurisdiction to grant
the relief sought.
That the agency has no power to grant the relief sought is not
a reason for refusing to require prior resort to the agency, if the case
involves a question within the agency's special competence.
3 K. DAVIS, ADMINIsRATIvE LAW § 19.07, at 39-40 (2d ed. 1960). The fed-
eral courts generally follow this approach, as do some state courts, but the
quotation in the text from Wisconsin Collectors Ass'n makes it clear that
the Wisconsin courts probably will not. See notes 149-50 supra, and ac-
companying text.
154. The "primary jurisdiction" rule has been applied to private pollu-
tion abatement actions in one other state. Ellison v. Rayonier, Inc., 156
F. Supp. 214 (W.D. Wash. 1957); Olympia Oyster Co. v. Rayonier, Inc., 229
F. Supp. 214 (W.D. Wash. 1964). These cases may have been legislatively
overruled in 1967 by Ch. 13, § 25, [1967] Wash. Laws 54. See Comment,
Water Pollution Control in Washington, 43 WASH. L. REv. 425, 451 (1967).
Cases which reject use of the "primary jurisdiction" rule in water pol-
lution matters are: Urie v. Franconia Paper Corp., 107 N.H. 131, 218 A.2d
360 (1966); Stanton v. Trustees of St. Joseph's College, 233 A.2d 718 (Me.
1967). Cf. Tevis v. McCrary, 72 N.M. 134, 381 P.2d 208 (1963), concerning
underground water rights adjudication under prior appropriation rules.
155. The Department has power to make investigations and inspections,
and to enter industrial establishments for collecting information. Wis.
STAT. §§ 144.025(2) (f), (g), 144.09 (1969).
156. For a lengthy description of the stages of procedure of the Depart-
ment, see D. CARMICHAEL, supra note 58, at 359-73.
157. WIs. STAT. § 144.025(2) (b) (1969).
158. WIS. STAT. § 144.025(2) Cc) (1969).
159. WIS. STAT. § 144.025(2) (d) (1) (1969).
160. WIS. STAT. § 144.025(2) (d) (2) (1969).
161. A person must file a formal petition with the Department under
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ment, which has staff and budgetary limitations, might be unwilling
to hear any individual complaint; it would more likely consolidate
the matter with others in its river basin surveys and hearings held
every seventh year. The Department must hold a public hearing
and issue findings of fact, conclusions of law and orders when six
or more citizens file a formal complaint concerning alleged or po-
tential environmental pollution.16 2 This provision does not neces-
sarily help an individual who wants pollution abated, however.
The primary jurisdiction and exhuastion of administrative rem-
edies rules are not particularly appropriate to private actions
brought to abate pollution. While the Department of Natural Re-
sources has special competence in the water quality field, it has no
specific authority to hear individual civil actions, and its procedures
are not well adapted to a fact-finding role in such cases. It seems
unlikely that the courts would insist on a plaintiff purusing an ad-
ministrative remedy when the agency can give at best indirect re-
lief as a by-product of a general regulatory scheme, if it chooses to
hear the complaint at all.
Further, the mandate of the Department of Natural Resources is
to set standards of quality in order to protect the public interest:
... which include [s] the protection of the public health
and welfare and the present and prospective future use of
[the waters of the state] for public and private water sup-
plies, propagation of fish and aquatic life and wildlife, do-
mestic and recreational purposes and agricultural, com-
mercial, industrial and other legitimate uses. In all cases
where the potential uses of water are in conflict, water
quality standards shall be interpreted to protect the general
public interest.' 63
Orders by the Department requiring a polluter to treat his wastes
may be well grounded in the public interest without being suffi-
ciently stringent to prevent damage to individual water users down-
stream. Finally, the Department can issue orders requiring waste
dischargers to abate pollution. It cannot grant specific relief to
complainants-either injunctions prohibiting any pollution that af-
fects the complainant or money damages. Since the regulatory
process does not afford sufficient relief to private interests, there is
still need for the private lawsuit to supplement the administrative
process.164
Thus, it is likely that a Wisconsin court would not invoke the "pri-
the procedure for declaratory rulings provided by WIs. STAT. § 227.06
(1969). This procedure might be used to bring to the attention of the
Department violations of water quality standards, general orders, and,
perhaps, special orders.
162. WIs. STAT. § 144.537 (1969).
163. WIS. STAT. § 144.025(2) (b) (1969).
164. One case in another state refused to apply the primary jurisdiction
rule because a lawsuit involves private rights, and the statutory scheme
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mary jurisdiction" or "exhaustion of administrative remedies" rules
in private pollution abatement actions.
III. LACK OF PRIVATE LITIGATION
While there have been a few cases in recent years involving pollu-
tion of groundwater,1 65 pollution of diffused surface water,166 and
air pollution,167 no common law case involving pollution of a wa-
tercourse has reached the Wisconsin Supreme Court since 1924.168
Throughout the country there has been a decline in common-law
water pollution abatement actions after a post-World War II
spurt. In the 1960's, only 17 cases reached any state supreme court;
in the 1950's there were 40 such cases, and in the 1940's there were
28.169 In the states immediately surrounding Wisconsin the trend
is even more pronounced. Indiana and Michigan have had no wa-
ter pollution cases whatsoever since 1940; Minnesota had two in the
1940's, Iowa had three in the 1940's and 50's, and Illinois had three in
the 1950's and one in the 1960's.170
A. State Enforcement
The dearth of reported common law water pollution cases
throughout the nation in the 1960's leads one to ask whether the
same trend is evident at the trial court level. Two studies on trial
court activity in the water pollution field have been made, one in
Wisconsin and one in Illinois. The Illinois study, made in the late
1950's,' 7' found two common law water pollution actions in local
courts in that state between 1940 and 1959 which were not appealed
to higher courts.172 In Wisconsin, DeBraal examined court records
allows for regulation of water quality only to promote the public interest.
Stanton v. Trustees of St. Joseph's College, 233 A.2d 718 (Me. 1967). See
Urie v. Franconia Paper Corp., 107 N.H. 131, 218 A.2d 360 (1966).
165. Enders v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 220 Wis. 254, 263 N.W. 568, rehearing
denied, 265 N.W. 67 (1936).
166. Thomas v. Village of Clear Lake, 270 Wis. 630, 72 N.W.2d 541 (1955);
Briggson v. City of Viroqua, 264 Wis. 47, 58 N.W.2d 546 (1953).
167. Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d 409, 129 N.W.2d 217
(1964); Hasslinger v. Village of Hartland, 234 Wis. 201, 290 N.W. 647 (1940).
168. Mitchell Realty Co. v. City of West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 199 N.W.
390 (1924).
169. From a count of cases in Appendices A, B, and C, plus cases in
the author's unpublished research notes involving deposit of mine tailings
in streams, inverse condemnation, negligence, and no theory of action
indicated.
170. Id.
171. F. L. MANN, H. H. ELLiS & N. G. P. KRAUSZ, WATER-USE LAW IN
ILLINOIS, 228-29, 288-89 (1964).
172. The list of cases was obtained by mailing questionnaires to the
county and circuit court clerks in each county in Illinois. There was a 75
percent return of questionnaires. Personal interviews were made with
each clerk who indicated there had been litigation in his court. Six water
pollution cases were found altogether, but four of them had been brought
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in the five central Wisconsin counties (Marathon, Wood, Portage,
Adams, and Juneau) and corresponded with the clerks of court in
two counties traversed by the lower Fox River (Brown and Outaga-
mie) .1 DeBraal found only one common law water pollution case
in the five central Wisconsin counties between 1947 and 1967. In the
same period there were four common law water pollution cases in
the two Fox River counties. De Braal suggests that reliance by
citizens on official state action may explain the paucity of private
plaintiffs:
It would appear to be fairly accurate to conclude that the
citizens of [the seven counties], and probably of the entire
State, are not interested in exercising their rights, but in-
stead are content to let the State act for them. Marathon
County is a case in point. In this county, no common law
water rights cases have been discovered. However, a
search through the files of the Conservation Warden, for
the years 1954 through 1965, reveals a total of 44 water
pollution cases alone, brought under the various statutes.
It is interesting to note that some of these, particularly
those dealing with the discharge of whey by dairies, could
have been brought by private citizens as common law ac-
tions. 174
Other information substantiates DeBraal's conclusion, to an ex-
tent. While not directly corresponding to the number of complaints
by the attorney general, three on behalf of the Sanitary Water Board. The
two common law cases were 3 Burt v. City of Flora, Gen. No. 56-1028
(Clay County Cir. Ct. 1956) (Complaint for injunction and damages to farm
resulting from pollution of creek by city sewer system. Injunction denied
on ground that city had complied with recommendations of Sanitary Water
Board to eliminate the pollution. Complaint for damages was dismissed
pursuant to stipulation by parties.); 5 Clem v. City of Paxton, C. L. origi-
nal No. 9595 (Ford County Cir. Ct., 1940) (Complaint for injunction and
damages to farm caused by discharge of sewage into stream. Damages of
$2,750 awarded. Injunction issued and complied with.).
According to F. L. MANN, H. H. ELLIS, & N. G. P. KRAusz supra note
171:
The completeness of reporting of local court cases by the responding
clerks of the circuit and county courts is not known. None of them
reported any of the three cases which were appealed and appear as
reported decisions. However, it is also not known whether those
reported cases were appealed from local courts whose clerks had
responded to the questionnaires. Those three reported cases are:
Clark v. Lindsay Light & Chem. Co., 341 Ill. App. 2d 316, 93 N.E.2d
441 (1950); Ruth v. Aurora Sanitary Dist., 17 Ill. 2d 11, 148 N.E.2d
601 (1959); Dunlop Lake Property Owners' Ass'n v. City of Edwards-
ville, 22 Ill. App. 2d 95, 159 N.E.2d 4 (1959). See also a federal court
decision reported in the same period: Gargac v. Smith Rowland
Co., 170 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1948).
173. J. DeBraal, Legal Tools for Combating Water Pollution in Wiscon-
sin: Does the Common Law Continue as a Significant Force at the Local
Level of Government? Spring 1967, at 22-24 (unpublished paper for the
River Basin Planning Seminar, University of Wisconsin). DeBraal is a
General Attorney with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, at the Law
School, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
174. J. DeBraal, id. at 23-24.
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by the public, the level of state enforcement activity contrasts
sharply with the dearth of common law water pollution actions.
For example, between August 1, 1966, and October 31, 1968, the Di-
vision of Environmental Protection and its predecessors issued 709
pollution abatement orders and referred 113 cases to the Attorney
General for enforcement. 1 75 Between January 1960 and May 1967,
the conservation wardens in the 24 Wisconsin River basin counties
made 238 arrests for violations of pollution statutes. 176  Of these,
82 were arrests involving commercial ventures such as cheese fac-
tories and canneries. Clearly, availability of state enforcement
procedures and active use of them by the state may be a major rea-
son why common law remedies are so rarely used. However, there
is also evidence that people are still dissatisfied with the degraded
quality of many streams in the state, especially those affected by
paper mill waste discharges. 177
B. Control of Shorelines by Industries
The pattern of ownership of riparian land may also explain the
lack of private water pollution actions in the Wisconsin River basin.
Because there are so many paper mills along the central portion of
the Wisconsin River, especially around Wisconsin Rapids, the mills
might own most of the land downstream from the waste discharge
outfalls, which are the reaches most affected by the resultant pollu-
tion. Such ownership would keep pollution abatement lawsuits
from arising.
County and city plat maps for the central portion of the Wiscon-
sin River from Merrill to Wisconsin Dells were examined to deter-
mine whether such a pattern of riparian ownership exists. 78  A
comparison was made between land ownership, the locations of
water discharge outfalls, 179 and the quality of the water along the
river's length.'8 0
175. Statement by Thomas Frangos, Administrator, Division of Environ-
mental Protection, Department of Natural Resources, State of Wisconsin,
to River Basin Planning Seminar, Law School, University of Wisconsin,
Oct. 31, 1968.
176. Unpublished research by Douglas Klingberg for author, summer
1967, based on interviews with conservation wardens and examination of
arrest records of the Division of Fish, Game and Enforcement, Department
of Natural Resources, State of Wisconsin, and its predecessors.
177. Id.
178. Plat maps for Lincoln (1966), Marathon (1968), Wood (1968), Port-
age (1967), Adams (1967), and Juneau (1967) Counties, published by Rock-
ford Map Publishers, Rockford, Ill.; county treasurer plat maps for Wausau,
Schofield, Rothchild, Stevens Point, Whiting, Biron, Wisconsin Rapids,
Port Edwards and Nekoosa. Preliminary research for this study was done
by Heiner Geise.
179. Locations of waste discharge outfalls of pulp and paper mills and of
municipal sewage treatment plants were provided by James Kerrigan,
Water Resources Center, Univ. of Wis., Madison, Wis.
180. Information on the quality of the river at various points was pro-
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The mills' location depends on the availability of water power.
Thus, there are many paper mills and power dam flowages between
Trappe Rapids and Castle Rock Dams. Because of the concentra-
tion of these mills, in only a few places are there long stretches of
non-industrial private riparian land along low-quality portions of
the river. The lowest quality stretches of the Wisconsin River lie
between Brokaw and the top of the Stevens Point Flowage (43 river
miles), between Stevens Point and the top of the Biron Flowage
(6 river miles), and between Biron and the top of the Petenwell
Flowage (19 river miles).' 8 ' The pulp and paper companies, and
the power companies own sizeable tracts of land along those low-
quality stretches of the river notably between Trappe Rapids and
Mosinee (27 river miles), through Stevens Point and Whiting (5
river miles), and between Biron and Nekoosa through Wisconsin
Rapids and Port Edwards (16 river miles). 182 Along those stretches
of the river, the paper mills control 40 per cent, 71 percent, and 64
per cent of the shoreline, respectively.1 8 3 After lands controlled by
power companies, other industries, and municipalities are deducted,
non-industrial private landowners are left with control of 37 per
cent, 8 per cent, and 24 per cent of the shoreline, respectively.1 8 4
Control of the shoreline may be gained by means other than own-
ership. Ownership of the bed of an artificial impoundment to the
highwater mark will deny acquisition of riparian status by lands
abutting the shore, because they would be legally severed from the
water.1'85  Significant portions of the beds of the Wausau, DuBay,
vided by James Kerrigan, Id. His determinations were made on the
basis of data on streamwater samplings and bottom biota samplings pub-
lished by the Division of Environmental Protection, Department of Natu-
ral Resources, State of Wisconsin, and its predecessor agencies. See Ap-
pendix F, infra.
181. See Appendix F, Table 4, infra.
182. Id., Table 1.
183. Id., Table 3.
184. Id.
185. In Wisconsin cases hold that riparian rights rest upon ownership
of the bank or shore of a watercourse in lateral contact with the water.
Mayer v. Grueber, 29 Wis. 2d 168, 138 N.W.2d 197 (1965); Colson v. Salz-
man, 272 Wis. 397, 75 N.W.2d 421 (1956); Hermansen v. City of Lake
Geneva, 272 Wis. 293, 75 N.W.2d 439 (1956); City of Milwaukee v. State,
193 Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820 (1927); Diedrich v. Northwestern Union Ry. Co.,
42 Wis. 248 (1877). But, when the deed describes the boundary as the
edge or shore of a watercourse, then title does not include the bed. Be-
cause the boundary runs along dry land and is not in lateral contact with
the water, riparian rights do not attach. Greene v. Nunnemacher, 36
Wis. 50 (1874) (dictum); Allen v. Weber, 80 Wis. 531, 50 N.W. 514 (1891).
A logical extension of these rules is that where the bed of a river or
lake is owned by other private persons, riparian rights do not attach to
lands bordering on the water. Pennsylvania has so held. Shaffer v.
Baylor's Lake Ass'n, 392 Pa. 493, 141 A.2d 583 (1958) (dictum); Loughran
v. Matylewicz, 367 Pa. 593, 81 A.2d 879 (1951); Baylor v. Decker, 133 Pa.
168, 19 A. 351 (1890).
The beds of the flowages on the Wisconsin River in many places are
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Stevens Point, Petenwell, and Castle Rock Flowages are owned by
either the pulp and paper companies or the power companies. Be-
cause of the severance rule, the pulp and papers mills and the power
companies have added 1-1/2 miles of controlled shoreline to the
9-3/4 miles of shoreline they own, thereby gaining control of 58 per
cent of the total shoreline around those three flowages. Other pri-
vate landowners retain control of 11-3/4 miles of shoreline (36 per
cent), and governmental units control 3 miles (9 percent) 186
Significant stretches of nonindustrial private ownership along the
low-quality reaches of the Wisconsin River lie between the DuBay
Flowage and the Stevens Point Flowage (6 miles), between Whiting
and Biron (10 river miles), and below Nekoosa (2 river miles). Ex-
cept for these 18 river miles, s7 the 129 river miles between Trappe
Rapids and Castle Rock Dam are abutted by relatively few riparian
owners who would have the legal right or inclination to bring a law-
suit for pollution abatement. Nonindustrial private landowners
control 87-1/4 miles of the 252-5/8 miles of shoreline between these
two points, or 34 percent. The percentage of such ownership at
places of industrial concentration is much lower.
In spite of this pattern of shoreline control, it would be hazardous
to assert that it is solely responsible for the dearth of common law
water pollution abatement actions. First, the type of pollution
caused by the pulp mills is not grossly offensive. Its most visible ef-
fect is a darkening of the water, an increase in turbidity, and the
creation of some foam. There are no loathsome odors, or globs of
floating debris, and fish kills are infrequent. Second, the degree of
pollution has not changed markedly in the past 20 or 30 years. It
may be regarded by the landowners as an unchanging condition, one
which has been in existence "from such time whence the memory of
man runneth not to the contrary. ''18 Third some nonindustrial pri-
vate landowners may be employees of the waste dischargers.
severed in ownership from the adjacent shorelands. In that situation, the
Wisconsin court is likely to follow its dictum in Greene v. Nunnemacher,
36 Wis. 50 (1874), and the Pennsylvania precedent, and hold that the beds
of the flowage are riparian and that the adjacent shorelands are not.
186. From the raw data taken from the map summarized in Appendix F,
Tables 1 and 2, infra.
187. Id.
188. This is the traditional phraseology. Traditionally a prescriptive
right is acquired when a custom or activity has continued from time im-
memorial, that is, from such ancient date, real or fictitious, that no con-
trary custom or activity can be remembered. According to the common
law, legal memory commences from the reign of Richard 1, A.D. 1189.
Under the statute of limitations of 32 Hen. 8, ch. 2 (1540), legal memory was
reduced to 60 years, and under that of 2 & 3 Wm. 4, ch. 71 (1833), it was
further reduced to 20 years. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (4th ed.
1951). The 20 year period of legal memory is used for acquisition of pre-
scriptive rights in Wisconsin. WIS. STAT. § 893.02 (1969). For a discussion
of prescription, see notes 89-97 supra, and accompanying text.
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Neither state action nor dominance of watercourses by industries
completely explains the lack of private litigation. During a brief
survey in the Wausau area, the author, attempting to find what ad-
vice attorneys give to clients on courses of action against polluters,
could find no attorney who had been consulted. Many minor rea-
sons for the lack of trial court activity may be suggested: the ex-
pense of litigation; the relative constancy of pollution levels over the
past 20 years, which has lulled affected riparians into inactivity
(and perhaps into the loss of a cause of action by prescription); lack
of awareness of common law rights; difficulties of proving cause;
general reluctance to consult lawyers; economic conflicts of interest,
either specific or general; and feeling by riparians that waste dis-
charges did not cause unreasonable pollution or nuisances. Finally,
the balance of the equities in riparian cases in favor of industrial
users may have persuaded some landowners to forego legal action.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has examined various aspects of the common law of
water pollution, has attempted to suggest the extent of its actual
use in litigation, and has enunciated several previously unrecog-
nized interpretations of the cases.
First, riparian rights and private nuisance doctrines are not co-
extensive and should not be equated. Private nuisance doctrine
has been employed by the courts primarily in cases involving inju-
ies to domestic or livestock water supplies, odors, and direct injuries
to the land. Riparian rights doctrine has usually been employed in
cases involving sedimentation of channels and millponds, pollution
of industrial water supplies, and deterioration of fishing.
Second, riparians have a legal right to discharge wastes into wa-
tercourses, provided the discharge is reasonable with respect to
other riparian uses and provided a private or public nuisance is not
created or maintained. That right applies only to relations between
riparians and does not affect the right of the state to regulate the
discharge of wastes under the police power.
Third, the comparative convenience doctrine, which calls for the
balancing of the equities of the parties, is generally used by the
courts, although many of them deny that fact in their decisions.
Most courts will discuss the equities of both parties, and will adopt
comparative convenience language when they feel the defendant's
conduct is reasonable under the circumstances, but will not use such
language when they feel the defendant's conduct is unreasonable.
Research by the author and others reveals a declining use of the
common law in seeking abatement of water pollution. It would
seem that, in spite of the difficulties involved in such cases, greater
use could be made of the common law in conjunction with state
regulation. The common law should be particularly useful against
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the large waste discharger who is using a greater proportion of the
assimilative capacity of a river than he would be entitled to under
the riparian reasonable use doctrine. In fact, what is reasonable
may be in the process of redefinition as a result of the establish-
ment of water quality standards by state regulatory agencies. Such
quantification of stream standards and the very recent development
of computer techniques for quantifying the effect of each waste dis-
charge on the overall water quality of a river adds powerful new
tools to the arsenal of the private litigant.189 With such tools to aid
in the problems of proof, the role of the private litigant in improv-
ing water quality could easily revive in the near future.
189. See, e.g., C. Falkner, A Dissolved Oxygen Prediction Model for a
Long River, 3 Institutional Design for Water Quality Management, Nov.
1970 (mimeo, Water Resources Center, Univ. of Wis.); Federal Water
Pollution Control Admin., Delaware Estuary Comprehensive Study (1966).
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